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Near daily news reports remind us that we live in an intelligence world. t
The U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) collects terabytes of global commu-
nications. 2 Most famously, the NSA's PRISM and UPSTREAM programs in-
tercepted and monitored the global internet-based communications and tele-
phone calls of foreign nationals, as well as those initiated or received by
persons outside of the United States. 3 These intercepts cover everything from
flirtatious emails between teenagers on distant shores to phone calls made by
foreign heads of state busied in statecraft with far-flung capitals.4 Foreign intel-
ligence services do their best to emulate or surpass American efforts.5 "Signals
intelligence"-the collection of remote electronic communications of foreign
targets-has become the coin of the security realm.6
1. See, e.g., Stephen Myers & Neil MacFarquhar, To Democrats, Email Hack Suggests
Trump Has an Ally: Putin, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/26/us/politics/kremlin-donald-trump-vladimir-putin.html (reporting
alleged hacking by Russian government into Democratic National Committee database).
2. See Robert Stein, Walter Mondale, & Caitlinrose Fisher, No Longer a Neutral Magistrate:
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in the Wake of the War on Terror, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2251,
2271-75 (2016) (discussing bulk surveillance programs); see also Rory Carroll, Welcome to Utah, the
NSA 's Desert Home for Eavesdropping on America, GUARDIAN (June 14, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/14/nsa-utah-data-facility (detailing the NSA's technical
capabilities); Charlie Savage, U.S. Privacy and Civil Liberty Watchdog Faces Limits in Congress, N.Y.
TIMES (July 14, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/us/us-privacy-and-civil-liberty-watchdog-
faces-limits-in-congress.html (discussing attempts to weaken NSA governmental oversight).
3. Glen Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data ofApple,
Google, and Others, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-
tech-giants-nsa-data (discussing PRISM); Ashley Gorski & Patrick C. Toomey, Unprecedented and Un-
lawl: The NSA's Upstream Surveillance, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 19, 2016, 3:32 PM),
https://wwwjustsecurity.org/33044/unprecedented-unlawful-nsas-upstream-surveillance/ (discussing
UPSTREAM).
4. See Melissa Eddy, File Is Said to Confirm N.S.A. Spied on Merkel, N.Y. TIMES (July 1,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/02/world/europe/file-is-said-to-confirm-nsa-spied-on-
merkel.html (discussing NSA efforts to hack the phone of Germany's chancellor); Charlie Savage, Let-
ter Tells of U.S. Searches for Emails and Calls, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/us/politics/letter-puts-focus-on-us-searches-for-americans-emails-
and-calls.html (reporting the search of personal electronic communications by the NSA).
5. See John Haines, Everything Old Is New Again: Russia Returns To Nicaragua, EURASIA
REv. (July 25, 2016), http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/07/everything-old-new-russia-retums-nicaragua/
(reporting on Russian increased signals intelligence efforts).
6. See Samuel Rascoff, Presidential Intelligence, 129 HARV. L. REV. 633, 662 (2016) (dis-




Current news coverage also evidences why governments around the
world feel compelled to collect ever-expanding troves of data. Apparently nor-
mal people commit mass murders at an alarming and growing rate-be it by
running a truck through a crowd of revelers in Nice, 7 by emptying ammunition
into a once-joyful crowd at an LGBT nightclub in Orlando,8 or by bombing a
peaceful demonstration for minority rights in Kabul.9 In each of these instanc-
es, one of the first questions is: could better security have prevented this attack?
Often, one of the first bits of information to surface in answer to this question
concerns the internet and cellphone habits of the perpetrator.i0
Global political discourse has made clear that intelligence gathering is on-
ly going to increase in response to the current terror threat. Under the banner of
law and order, President Donald Trump has staked out extreme positions on the
reach of intelligence and military assets to root out threats to the United
States. 1 Fascists in France have similarly sought to claim the mantle of in-
creased surveillance.12 But even politicians closer to their respective main-
streams appear to concede that increased signals intelligence will inevitably
form part of policies aimed at stemming the flow of radicalization, weaponry,
and mass atrocities.13 In this context, global signals intelligence practices have
pushed privacy as we know it to the brink of extinction. Efforts to collect intel-
ligence capture deeply intimate conversations of ordinary people around the
world.1 4 They also capture information that in most contexts would be deemed
privileged and as such beyond the scope of prying eyes.' 5 Yet to accept that
7. See Alissa Rubin, ISIS Claims Truck Attacker in France Was Its Soldier, N.Y. TIMES (Ju-
ly 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/17/world/europe/isis-nice-france-attack.html.
8. See Sheryl Stolberg, Orlando Attack Roils Gay Community, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/13/us/orlando-attack-roils-gay-community.html.
9. See Mujib Mashal & Zahra Nader, ISIS Claims Deadly Bombing at Demonstration in Ka-
bul, Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/24/world/asia/kabul-
afghanistan-explosions-hazaras-protest.html.
10. See Aurelien Breeden, Attacker in Nice Plotted for Months and Had Accomplices, French
Prosecutor Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/world/europe/
attacker-in-nice-plotted-for-months-and-had-accomplices-french-prosecutor-says.html (discussing the
texting habits of the Nice murder).
11. See Patrick Healy & Jonathan Martin, His Tone Dark, Donald Trump Takes GOP Mantle,
N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/us/politics/donald-trump-rnc-
speech.html.
12. See Bojan Pancevski & Richard Kerbaj, Nice Official and Marine Le Pen Question
French Resolve Against Terror, AUSTRALIAN (July 17, 2016), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news
/world/the-times/nice-official-and-marine-le-pen-question-french-resolve-against-terror/news-
story/02d56la8aa87be86ee28aO2ebda0el6d.
13. See Nolan McCaskill, Clinton Urges 'Intelligence Surge' to Counter Terrorist Threat,
POLITICO (June 13, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/hillary-clinton-national-security-
224267; Jenna McLaughlin, Senate Narrowly Rejects Controversial FBI Surveillance Expansion-For
Now, INTERCEPT (June 22, 2016), https://theintercept.com/2016/06/22/senate-narrowly-rejects-
controversial-fbi-surveillance-expansion-for-now/ (noting Sen. John McCain's support for broader in-
ternet surveillance).
14. See Alejandro Abdo & Patrick Toomey, The NSA Is Turning the Internet into a Total
Surveillance System, GUARDIAN (Aug. 11, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013
/aug/l /nsa-internet-surveillance-email; Robert Hackett, No, NSA Phone Spying Has Not Ended,
FORTUNE (Dec. 1, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/12
/01/nsa-phone-bulk-collection-end/ (noting that foreign surveillance operations can continue under Ex-
ecutive Order No. 12333 despite the recent passage of the Freedom Act).
15. Abdo & Toomey, supra note 14.
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such communications will be analyzed by government agents to determine who
poses a security threat is to destroy the possibility of intimacy: to have commu-
nications "of a very personal or private nature" away from public scrutiny. 16
Sacrificing privacy risks upending basic preconditions for the pursuit of a
dignified life. The link between privacy and dignity is at the forefront of recent
U.S. jurisprudence on sexual privacy such as Lawrence v. Texas and Obergefell
v. Hodges.'7 Jurisprudential discourses across the Atlantic at least, and as this
Article will show, globally, converge on the view that without privacy, "no so-
ciety can maintain any form of community."' 8 Both the concept of a "self' as
distinct from society and of "society" as a community distinct from "selves"
require privacy protections sufficient to allow meaningful discourse between
"selves" through which both self and community can be constituted.19
The consequent need for increased regulation is not lost on commentators
and government officials. Recent commentary on cyber-surveillance by Presi-
dent Obama's inaugural director for privacy and civil liberties, Timothy Edgar,
notes that it is "no longer desirable or even possible to protect the privacy of
Americans while leaving the rules for most global surveillance programs entire-
ly to the Executive Branch." 20 In fact, the logic of Mr. Edgar's analysis goes
one step further: given the global scale of surveillance programs, one needs a
global solution to protect privacy everywhere.21 Privacy in the internet age is
secured globally or not at all.22
Problematically, existing international law approaches to the protection of
global privacy rights face significant hurdles when applied to the digital age of
signals intelligence, leading to an apparent normative gap in the law. As dis-
cussed in Section I.A, much of the literature focuses on human rights treaty
protections of privacy rights.23 This approach faces three major limitations: (1)
territorial limitations on the scope of core treaties such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) make these treaties facially in-
applicable to existing programs such as those reportedly conducted by the
16. Intimate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2014).
17. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
577 (2003).
18. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113
YALE L.J. 1151, 1167 (2004). Whitman's article argues that when put to the test, U.S. law does not fol-
low such a dignity conception of law. As proof, writing in 2004, he notes that "we can declare that
American gays can realistically expect only to have their liberty rights protected. The prospects for the
kind of dignitary protections embodied in a law of gay marriage, we could say, are remote." Id. at 1221.
It might well be argued that Professor Whitman's distrust of American jurisprudence and its willingness
fully to embrace dignity within its mainstream has been misplaced.
19. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the
Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 963, 973-74, 1006-07 (1989).
20. Timothy Edgar, Go Big, Go Global: Subject the NSA's Overseas Program to Judicial




23. See Marko Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the
Digital Age, 56 HARV. INT'L L.J. 81 (2015). For a full discussion of the literature, see infra Section L.A
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NSA;24 (2) stakeholders such as China are not meaningfully included in the
treaty web; 25 and (3) the treaty rights in question are subject to derogation
when they are needed the most.26 A treaty approach therefore requires addi-
tional agreement, though such agreement is unlikely to be forthcoming, as Sec-
tion I.B. discusses. This problem could be overcome if the privacy protections
enshrined in human rights treaties could be extended by reliance upon another
source of international law to current global, extraterritorial signals intelligence
programs directed at intercepting, storing, analyzing, and using electronic
communications. As discussed in Section I.C., efforts have thus far focused up-
on customary international law as the principal candidate. This approach faces
difficulties as custom relies upon the existence of state practice consistent with
an international legal norm. With a field as young as digital, global communi-
27cations, the use of analogies in the literature is easily contested, while state
practice tends to favor surveillance over privacy generally. 28
As the current state of engagement with privacy problems at the inter-
governmental and academic level shows, this gap must be filled soon. At worst,
this gap invites submissions that global signals intelligence surveillance pro-
grams are presumptively permissible because they are not prohibited by any
29one rule of international law. At best, the current state of the literature pro-
vides soft law guidance on best practices in the surveillance realm.3 A differ-
ent perspective on the issue therefore could meaningfully advance legal and
policy discourses on the need for global privacy protections.
This Article therefore proposes a paradigm shift. It submits the existence
of a Privacy Principle, or general principle of law protecting the right to priva-
cy.
The Article proceeds as follows. After addressing the above problems in-
temational law faces in protecting privacy rights in Part I, Part II explains that
general principles of law are a co-equal source of international law grounded in
24. See Charlie Savage, U.S., Rebuffing U.N., Maintains Stance that Rights Treaty Does Not
Apply Abroad, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/14/world/us-affirms-
stance-that-rights-treaty-doesnt-apply-abroad.html.
25. See China: Ratify Key International Human Rights Treaty, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 8,
2013), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/08/china-ratify-key-international-human-rights-treaty ("Chi-
na is the only country among the permanent members of the UN Security Council not to have joined the
ICCPR.").
26. Paul Schwen, Human Rights Derogation in France in Response to Terrorism, NAT'L
SECURITY L. BRIEF (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.nationalsecuritylawbrief.com/human-rights-derogation-
in-france-in-response-to-terrorism/.
27. See infra Section I.C.
28. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
OPERATIONS 193 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2d ed. 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0].
29. See Cmd. Michael Adams, Jus Extra Bellum: Reconstructing the Ordinary, Realistic
Conditions ofPeace, 5 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 377, 403-04 (2014) (applying the principle that no prohibi-
tion equals permission in international law).
30. See Ashley S. Deeks, Confronting and Adapting: Intelligence Agencies and International
Law, 102 VA. L. REv. 599, 682 (2016) ("[T]he sliding scale interpretive approach to intelligence is a
normative proposal, but it contains positive elements as well, because it reflects the general direction
rule-of-law states are heading.").
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comparative legal research intended to fill gaps in international law. 31 Part III
suggests that a critical mass of legal systems agrees upon the existence of a
right to privacy thus permitting the derivation of a Privacy Principle. Part IV
then explains how the Privacy Principle protects reasonable expectations of se-
clusion in real and virtual spaces (the home, correspondence, etc.) and in inti-
macy of content (marital relations, health, etc.). Finally, Part V shows how the
Privacy Principle balances reasonable expectations of seclusion against the
publicity interest of the intruding party and the interest of the public at large,
employing a proportionality test.
The core contribution of the Privacy Principle is to fill the gap left open
in international law by human rights treaty and customary international law ap-
proaches. It extends many of the same protections already advocated in the
human rights context by means of a source of law more immune to the kind of
technical pushback plaguing treaty and customary international law argu-
ments.32 It provides a platform to apply these protections to non-state actors as
a matter of transnational law. 33 It further improves upon existing aspirational
approaches by providing a positive basis for treating global invasions of priva-
cy as internationally wrongful.34 It does so by showing that privacy is indeed a
central component of common law, civil law, mixed jurisdictions, Confucian,
and Islamic traditions and domestic legal systems. The Privacy Principle thus
proves that privacy is a global value worthy of global protection.
I. THE PRIVACY PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
This Part briefly appraises the current state of the global privacy litera-
ture. It begins with a review of the dominant human rights treaty privacy para-
digm. It continues with an examination of possible alternative treaty bases for
curtailing signals intelligence programs. It next inquires whether customary in-
ternational law could be of help in protecting privacy interests. Part I concludes
that there remains a gap in privacy protections: existing legal discourses can
only incompletely address the challenges posed by extraterritorial signals intel-
ligence programs in the digital world.
31. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(l)(c), opened for signature June
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1051, 33 U.N.T.S. 993; see also HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 93 (rev. ed. 2011); Michael D. Nolan & Fr~d~ric Gilles Sourgens,
Issues ofProofof General Principles ofLaw in International Arbitration, 3 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION
REV. 505, 509-10 (2009); John G. Sprankling, The Global Right to Property, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 464, 486 (2014).
32. See sources cited supra notes 23-26.
33. See GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND RUNNING
CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 76-80 (2010) (discussing the need for transnation-
al law in the context of global self-regulation).
34. See Deeks, supra note 30, at 682.
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A. The Human Right ofPrivacy Approach
1. The Human Rights Treaty Privacy Paradigm
The right to privacy is codified in a number of human rights instru-
ments.35 Centrally, it is included in one of the most widely subscribed funda-
mental international human rights treaties, the ICCPR.36 Article 17 provides
that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour
and reputation."3 7 Article 19 adds:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other
media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions,
but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of
public health or morals. 38
Together, these two provisions make up the backbone of the human right
to privacy as it is conceived in contemporary international law.
The ICCPR poses significant interpretive challenges.39 It is not clear on
its face what the ICCPR includes within the scope of "privacy." 40 It further
does not provide concrete guidance as to what state conduct would be deemed
414
unlawful.41 Finally, it does not clearly define exceptions to this general rule.42
All three questions-what is "private," what constitutes an unreasonable intru-
sion by the state into a person's private sphere, and what may excuse an other-
wise unlawful intrusion-have been discussed in jurisprudence and scholar-
ship.43
According to these sources, privacy protection extends to any personal in-
formation to which one would develop a reasonable expectation of freedom of
intrusion. The fulcrum of this reasonable expectation first requires that con-
35. American Convention on Human Rights art. 11, Nov. 29, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights art. 8, Nov. 4 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]; G.A. Res.
217 (Ill) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 12 (Dec. 10, 1948).
36. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17(1), Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
37. Id.
38. Id. art. 19.
39. Milanovic, supra note 23, at 101 (discussing the importance of the ICCPR for the human
right to privacy).
40. ICCPR, supra note 36, art. 19.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See infra notes 389-94 and accompanying text.
44. See Jordan Paust, Can You Hear Me Now?: Private Communications, National Security,
and the Human Rights Disconnect, 15 CH1. J. INT'L L. 612, 628-29 (2015) (developing a "reasonable
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duct is substantively personal. 45 Centrally, the ICCPR deems thoughts and
opinions, religious beliefs, health, family relationships, friendships, and sexual
encounters between consenting adults all sufficiently within the scope of sub-
stantively personal matters.46 It is reasonable to extend such protections to the
personal preparations lawfully taken to engage the public in political discourse,
artistic expression, or commercial intercourse. 47
Second, expectations are reasonable when a person acts in a non-public
space.48 The home is the quintessential non-public space.49 Similarly, items or
activities carried on one's person are typically deemed non-public, as well as
effects or activities in areas in which a person has the right to exclude others
(say a hotel room or business premises). 51 Finally, the ICCPR expressly ex-
tends privacy protections to correspondence. 52
At a minimum, the state must inform persons living under its jurisdiction
of how, where, and why it will intrude upon otherwise non-public spaces and
which types of information the state will gather.53 This allows individuals to
form minimum expectations of privacy and to adapt their behavior in response
54
to transparent and well-justified programs.
expectation of privacy" approach in the context of communications). But see Craig Forcese, Spies With-
out Borders: International Law and Intelligence Collection, 5 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 179, 193-
94 (2011) (noting that the text of the ICCPR does not define a clear zone of expectation of privacy).
45. See Francesca Bignami & Giorgio Resta, Transatlantic Privacy Regulation: Conflict and
Cooperation, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231, 233 (2015) (noting that the human right to privacy attach-
es to personal information); George E. Edwards, International Human Rights Challenges to the New
International Criminal Court: The Search and Seizure Right to Privacy, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 323, 331
(2001) (discussing the link between privacy, autonomy, and intimacy).
46. See G. Alex Sinha, NSA Surveillance Since 9/11 and the Human Right to Privacy, 59
Loy. L. REV. 861, 911-14 (2013) (providing a similar list of personal matters as reflected in the litera-
ture); Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and International Judicial Protection of Individual Rights: A Com-
parative Legal Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41 HASTINGS L. J. 805, 843 (1990) (noting the
European Commission's expansive interpretation of the right to privacy as protecting the right to estab-
lish and maintain relationships with other human beings).
47. See F. Jay Dougherty, Foreword: The Right to Publicity - Towards a Comparative and
International Perspective, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 421, 437 n.116 (1998) (noting that privacy and free-
dom of expression in Quebec including artistic expression); Strossen, supra note 46, at 843 (noting the
expansive right of privacy to protect the right to establish and maintain relationships with other human
beings); Yana Welinder, A Face Tells More than a Thousand Posts: Developing Face Recognition Pri-
vacy in Social Networks, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 165, 170 (2012) (noting the importance of privacy on
Facebook "precisely because of its important role" in "facilitating social interaction and political dis-
course").
48. See Edwards, supra note 45, at 331, 395 (noting the protection of the home and other
non-public spaces).
49. See ICCPR, supra note 36, art. 17(1); Edwards, supra note 45, at 390-91 (discussing the
legal origins of the inviolability of the home).
50. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
51. See Milanovic, supra note 23, at 122 (noting that intrusion into a person's hotel room
would violate ICCPR privacy protections).
52. See Human Rights Comm., General Comment 16, Twenty-second session, 1988, para. 8
U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 1 (1994) (hereinafter General Comment 16); see also Paust, supra note 44,
at 628-29 (noting the absolute expectation of privacy in the context of sealed correspondence and ana-
lyzing its implications in the digital age using an expectation of privacy approach).
53. See General Comment 16, supra note 52, para. 10; see also Craig Martin, Kiobel, Extra-
terrioriality, and the "Global War on Terror," 28 MD. J. INT'L L. 146, 155 (2013) (explaining exercises
ofjurisdiction in international law).
54. See Maj. Peter Beaudette Jr., Compliance Without Credit: The National Security Agency
and the International Right to Privacy, 73 A.F. L. REV. 25, 40-46 (2015) (stressing the importance of
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Such information about the existence and scope of governmental pro-
grams alone is insufficient to bring them into compliance with human rights ob-
ligations.55 Rather, the state's unreasonable intrusion of privacy is unlawful
even if it is fully disclosed ahead of time.56 No state could be permitted to ob-
serve sexual acts performed within its territory simply by advertising its inten-
tion to do so without running afoul of privacy protections.57 Rather, the state
may only curtail privacy rights in the penumbras of private and public space
and may not obliterate an individual's right to engage in a fruitful private life
by entirely defining private spaces out of existence. In other words, the state
must permit persons a reasonable safe-harbor within which they can interact
with each other away from prying eyes.
Human rights treaty norms remain sensitive to national security needs. 60
Thus, the state may intrude upon otherwise private conduct to the extent pro-
portionate with specific threats, as long as the process leading to the intrusion
otherwise complies with basic norms of due process.61 This proportionality
analysis typically requires that the state respond with particularity to a specific
danger rather than engage in dragnet intelligence collection. 62
2. The Asserted Territorial Limitation ofHuman Rights Law
One core challenge for the human rights treaty paradigm is the objection
lodged by the United States that human rights instruments have purely territori-
al application.63 Given the United States' current technological capabilities,
foreseeability in human rights privacy jurisprudence); James D. Fry, Privacy, Predictability, and Inter-
net Surveillance in the U.S. and China: Better the Devil You Know?, 37 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 419, 440
(2015) ("In general, the law needs to be crafted with adequate precision so that people can adjust their
conduct in order to comply with the law, and the law must be knowable by the public, which are basic
characteristics of law in general.").
55. See Berta E. Hemandez-Truyol, Querying Lawrence, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1151, 1175-76
(2004) (noting human rights jurisprudence confirming that the definition of privacy is not a matter of
purely domestic concern and thus subject to international review).
56. See Carlos Torres et al., Indiscriminate Power: Racial Profiling and Surveillance Since
9/11, 18 U. PA. J. L. & Soc. CHANGE 283, 305 (2015) (noting jurisprudence that intrusion into privacy
must be substantively reasonable).
57. See Aaron Fellmeth, State Regulation of Sexuality in International Human Rights Law
and Theory, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 797, 809 (2008) (noting that jurisprudence confirms that intrusion
into the most intimate areas of a person's life such as sexuality requires particularly serious reasons).
58. See Hemandez-Truyol, supra note 55; Torres et al., supra note 56; Fellmeth, supra note
57.
59. See sources cited supra note 36.
60. See Milanovic, supra note 23, at 139 (noting deference to states on national security in-
terests in the human rights context).
61. See Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VA. J. INT'L
L. 291, 305-06 (2015) (discussing the European-based proportionality paradigm of privacy limitations
and articulating alternative bases to limit privacy rights); Fry, supra note 54, at 442-43 (adopting a pro-
portionality test); Elizabeth B. Ludwin King, A Conflict of Interests: Privacy, Truth, and Compulsory
DNA Testing for Argentina's Children of the Disappeared, 44 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 535, 553 (2011)
(same).
62. See Milanovic, supra note 23, at 137 (noting ECtHR jurisprudence on proportionality to
this effect).
63. See Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the
Rule ofLaw, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1333, 1353 (2007) (noting consistent U.S. practice regarding terri-
torial application of human rights treaties).
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such an objection creates practical problems for global privacy rights. A better
understanding of the formal legal basis for the objection is therefore indispen-
sable to developing global privacy rights.
Contemporary global signals intelligence programs can operate entirely
outside of the territory of a signatory state.6 Due to the nature of the internet,
this is true even for surveillance of a state's own nationals. 65 Some are there-
fore concerned that such signals intelligence is beyond the reach of the privacy
protections codified in the ICCPR. 66
The dominant view of international courts and tribunals interpreting hu-
man rights treaties is that human rights treaty obligations apply globally. In the
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall Advisory Opinion, the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ) interpreted the geographic scope of the ICCPR
as codified in Article 2(1).67 Article 2(1) states that the treaty imposes obliga-
tions upon a state party with regard to "all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction."68 The ICJ observed that "while the jurisdiction of
States is primarily territorial, it may sometimes be exercised outside the nation-
al territory," and ruled that "[c]onsidering the object and purpose of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it would seem natural that, even
when such is the case, States parties to the Covenant should be bound to com-
ply with its provisions."69 In doing so, the ICJ expressly endorsed the "constant
practice of the Human Rights Committee" tasked with the interpretation and
application of the ICCPR. 70
The interpretation of the ICCPR by the ICJ and the U.N. Human Rights
Committee is consistent with jurisprudence by bodies interpreting regional hu-
man rights treaties such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the
American Convention on Human Rights. The European Convention facially
64. See Stein et al., supra note 2 (discussing the limitations of current territoriality-based
regulation of U.S. cyber-surveillance programs); Carly Nyst, US-Based Surveillance and Data Collec-
tion: New UN Report Provides Guidance on PRISM, PRIVACY INT'L (June 12, 2013),
https://www.privacyintemational.org/node/185 (discussing the extraterritorial application of surveillance
laws in the context of PRISM).
65. See Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 325, 326 (2015) ("An
e-mail sent from Germany, for example, may transit multiple nations, including the United States, before
appearing on the recipient's device in neighboring France. Contact books created and managed in New
York may be stored in data centers in the Netherlands. A document saved to the cloud and accessed
from Washington, D.C., may be temporarily stored in a data storage center in Ireland, and possibly even
copied and held in multiple places at once. These unique features of data raise important questions about
which "here" and "there" matter; they call into question the normative significance of longstanding dis-
tinctions between what is territorial and what is extraterritorial. Put bluntly, data is destabilizing territo-
riality doctrine.")
66. See Milanovic, supra note 23, at 110.
67. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 1.C.J. 136 (July 9).
68. ICCPR, supra note 36, art. 2(1).
69. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, 2004 I.C.J. at 176.
70. Id.; see also Human Rights Comm., Lopez v. Uruguay, Communication No. R.12/52:
Uruguay, 12.3, U.N. Doe. A/36/40 (July 29, 1981) (rejecting a purely territorial interpretation of ICCPR
as "unconscionable"); Human Rights, Comm., Gen. Cmt. 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 1 10 (Mar. 29, 2004)
(rejecting a purely territorial interpretation of ICCPR).
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applies to "everyone within [the High Contracting Parties'] jurisdiction." 7 '
When the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been asked to defme
whether "jurisdiction" extends to protect persons residing outside a Contracting
Party's territory, but whose data has been routed through the Contracting Par-
ty's territory, it has been willing to find liability for violation of the right to pri-
vacy.72 Similar results tend to be obtained under the jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights.73 International organizations have adopted
similar positions outside of the judicial or quasi-judicial context providing a
reasonable basis to imply a growing state practice of supporting this interpreta-
tion of human rights instruments.74
If this position were adopted, privacy rights could be secured against state
intelligence collection through further interpretation and application of human
rights treaties. Privacy rights developed predominantly in the context of inva-
sions of privacy within a state's territorial boundaries could easily be applied to
the extraterritorial conduct of states.
The core problem for such an approach is that the United States has re-
jected the extraterritorial application of privacy protections in human rights
treaties such as the ICCPR. As noted by the ICJ in the Wall advisory opinion,
Article 2(1) of the ICCPR has two potential interpretations: one which was fi-
nally endorsed in the advisory opinion itself as discussed above, and an alterna-
tive interpretation that the provision "cover[s] only individuals who are both
present within a State's territory and subject to that State's jurisdiction." 76 The
United States has adopted this second approach to the ICCPR.77 It submits that
the "and" between "territory" and "subject to its jurisdiction" in Article 2(1) is
71. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 1.
72. See, e.g., Liberty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008); see also
Milanovic, supra note 23, at 127 ("In ... Liberty and Others v. the United Kingdom, two of the appli-
cants were Irish organizations that communicated with a British one, and their communication was al-
legedly intercepted in the United Kingdom. Neither the U.K. government nor the Court proprio motu
considered that an Article I jurisdiction issue arose with respect to the Irish applicants-that is, they
both assumed that the ECHR applied, and the Court went on to find a violation of Article 8." (footnote
omitted)).
73. Milanovic, supra note 23, at 114, n.135 (citing Decision on Request for Precautionary
Measures: Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Cuba, 41 1.L.M. 532 (2002); Coard
v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 109/99, T 37 (1999); Alejandre v.
Cuba, Case 11.589, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 86/99, ¶ 23 (1999); Saldaflo v. Argentina P,
Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 38/99, ¶¶ 15-23 (1999)).
74. Freedom of Expression and the Internet, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R. Report No. 11/13,
OEA/Ser.LV/I., 57-79 (2013), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/docs/reports/2014_04 08
IntemetENG%20-WEB.pdf.
75. See Second and Third Periodic Reports of the United States of America to the UN Com-
mittee on Human Rights Concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.S.
DEP'T STATE, at annex 1(2005), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/55504.htm#annexl.
76. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, 2004 I.C.J., at 179.
77. ICCPR, supra note 36, art. 2(1). For the development of the U.S. position, see Michael J.
Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times ofArmed Conflict and Mili-
tary Occupation, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 119, 123-24 (2005) (quoting UN Does. E/CN.4/SR.193, at 13, 18
(1950), E/CN.4/SR.194, at 5, 9 (1950) (statements of Eleanor Roosevelt)). See also RESTATEMENT
(FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: JURISDICTION § 203 (Am. Law Inst., Tentative Drafit No. 2,
2016) (codifying the territoriality presumption of federal statutes); Martin, supra note 53, at 204-05 (dis-
cussing inconsistencies in this presumption in the so-called war on terror).
2017] 355
356 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 42:2
a conjunction rather than disjunction.78 The ICCPR applies only if both ele-
ments (territory and jurisdiction) are established.79 Consequently, global or ex-
traterritorial conduct is not within the scope of the ICCPR.80 Adding further
complication, the United States has not acceded to the additional protocol to the
ICCPR that would require it to submit disputes concerning the application and
interpretation of the ICCPR to an international body, the Human Rights Com-
mittee.8 The jurisprudence of that body therefore has limited authority when
invoked against the United States.82
Recent U.S. Legal Advisers to the State Department have attempted to
move the U.S. position with regard to the extraterritorial application of general
human rights treaties. As noted by then-Legal Adviser of the United States
State Department Harold Koh, the global consensus regarding the application
of the ICCPR is that it is not limited to the territory of the signatory state. 83
Harold Koh consequently sought to change the U.S. position on the extraterri-
torial application of the ICCPR.84 Although the weight of scholarly authority
stands with Harold Koh's position, this attempt has at least formally failed.
78. ICCPR, supra note 36, art. 2(1)
79. U.S. DEP'T STATE, U.S. Observations on Human Rights Committee General Comment 31
(2007), http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/1/2007/112674.htm ("[B]ased on the plain and ordinary meaning of
its text, this Article establishes that States Parties are required to ensure the rights in the Covenant only
to individuals who are both within the territory of a State Party and subject to that State Party's sover-
eign authority." (emphasis in original)).
80. Id.
81. U.N. HUM. HIGH RTS. COMMISSIONER, Status ofRatification, http://indicators.ohchr.org
(noting that the United States is not a member of the first protocol to the ICCPR).
82. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1,
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ("A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a
Party to the present Protocol recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider com-
munications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that
State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.").
83. Memorandum from Harold Koh, Office of the Legal Adviser of the U.S. Dep't State (Oct.
19, 2010), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/state-department-iccpr-memo.pdf
("[A]n interpretation of Article 2(1) that is truer to the Covenant's language, context, object and pur-
pose, negotiating history, and subsequent understandings of other States Parties, as well as the interpre-
tations of other international bodies, would provide that in fact, the Covenant does impose certain obli-
gations on a State Party's extraterritorial conduct under certain circumstances.").
84. Id.
85. See Oona Hathaway et al., Human Rights Abroad: When Do Human Rights Obligations
Apply Extraterritorially?, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 389, 395 (2011) (discussing the weight of scholarly authority
on the extraterritorial application of the ICCPR); Milanovic, supra note 23, at 108-09 (also discussing
the weight of scholarly authority on the extraterritorial application of the ICCPR).
86. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report
of the United States of America, 1 4, U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 (Apr. 23, 2014) [hereinafter Hu-
man Rights Committee Fourth Periodic Report of the United States] (expressing the Committee's regret
that the United States maintains its territorial interpretation of ICCPR's applicability). An argument
could be made that the United States responded to international legal criticism of its NSA UPSTREAM
and PRISM programs. See Human Rights Committee Fourth Periodic Report of the United States, supra
(outlining criticism); SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE REFORM 2015 ANNIVERSARY REPORT, U.S. DIR. OF NAT'L
INTELLIGENCE (2015), https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/ppd-28/2015/privacy-civil-liberties (detailing
changes to U.S. policy following President Obama's Presidential Policy Directive PPD-28 in January
2014); Sarah Childress, How the NSA Spying Programs Have Changed After Snowden, PBS (Feb. 9,
2015), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/how-the-nsa-spying-programs-have-changed-since-
snowden/ (discussing the 2015 Signals Intelligence Reform Anniversary Report of the U.S. Director of
National Intelligence). Whether this movement was due to a sense of legal constraint or simply as a re-
sponse to public pressure in light of the Snowden revelations is unclear. In any event, there is a good
chance that the current administration will change course, thus limiting the probative value of this poten-
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3. The Limitations of the Human Rights Discourse
The position of the United States has raised a significant amount of un-
derstandable scholarly consternation.87 A significant literature has developed
seeking to confirm the global consensus on the global applicability of the
88ICCPR. Much of that literature is aimed at critiquing the shortcomings of
U.S. global signals intelligence programs,89 or their asserted compliance with
human rights norms. 90
Laudable and necessary though this literature is, it cannot convincingly
provide a vehicle for international law privacy protections in the digital world.
It continues to repeat the same arguments already rejected by its main audience:
the United States government.91 If Harold Koh-formerly dean of Yale Law
School and leading authority on the subject matter--could not convince Secre-
tary of State Clinton and President Obama when acting as Legal Adviser to the
State Department that the ICCPR should bind United States conduct on a global
scale, it is reasonably unlikely that any amount of scholarly industry could con-
vince the United States to change its mind on the extraterritorial application of
human rights protections as a matter of treaty law.92 This literature therefore
may cogently propose an alternative interpretation of human rights preferable
to the U.S. approach, but it does not provide the means of overcoming existing
objections.
tial change in U.S. state practice. See Natasha Lomos, Trump Order Strips Privacy Rights from Non-
U.S. Citizens, Could Nix EU-US Data Flows, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 26, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/26/trump-order-strips-privacy-rights-from-non-u-s-citizens-could-nix-
eu-us-data-flows/ (discussing moves by the Trump Administration to undo relevant privacy protections
put in place by the Obama Administration).
87. See, e.g., Zachary D. Clopton, Territoriality, Technology, and National Security, 83 U.
CHI. L. REv. 45, 46 (2016) (attacking territorial paradigms to surveillance as misguided from a U.S. law
perspective); Daskal, supra note 65, at 330 (2015) (noting that the features of data in the internet age
"call into question the normative significance of longstanding distinctions between what is territorial and
what is extraterritorial" and arguing for greater international harmonization of privacy laws); Milanovic,
supra note 23, at 108-09 (criticizing the U.S. position and summarizing international legal scholarship
that also criticizes the U.S. position).
88. See, e.g., Milanovic, supra note 23, at 108-09 (criticizing the U.S. position and summa-
rizing international legal scholarship doing so); Daniel Joyce, Privacy in the Digital Era: Human Rights
Online?, 16 MELB. J. INT'L L. 270, 284 (2015) (noting that, while Milanovic's work is a useful first step,
more work on human rights in the data privacy context is needed).
89. See Ashley Decks, Intelligence Communities, Peer Constraints, and the Law, 7 HARV.
NAT'L SECURITY J. 1, 21 n.91 (2015) (collecting recent scholarship critical of the international legality
of NSA programs).
90. See, e.g., Beaudette, supra note 54, at 26 (arguing that existing U.S. legal constraints ren-
der NSA surveillance programs lawful); Peter Marguilies, The NSA in Global Perspective: Surveillance,
Human Rights, and International Counterterrorism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137,2139 (2014) (same).
91. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of the
United States of America, 14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 (Apr. 23, 2014).
92. Compare Marko Milanovic, Harold Koh's Legal Opinions on the US Position on the Ex-
traterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 7, 2014),
http://www.ejiltalk.org/harold-kohs-legal-opinions-on-the-us-position-on-the-extraterritorial-
application-of-human-rights-treaties/ (discussing the advocacy impact of the publication of the legal
opinions), with Savage, supra note 24 (noting the failure of these efforts due to security concerns).
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Moreover, the damage in many ways has been done. China is not a party
to the ICCPR or other human rights treaties containing a privacy protection. 93
At present, Chinese domestic public "laws do not expressly (or even implicitly)
restrict the government's powers with internet surveillance, let alone when na-
tional security and public interests are involved." 94 It stands to reason that no
such constraint exists extraterritorially. The current U.S. positioning on the
right to privacy is unlikely to place much political pressure on China to change
95
course.
Russia, too, has a problematic track record with regard to compliance of
its signal intelligence programs with robustly formulated human rights norms.
The European Court of Human Rights recently reviewed a Russian program for
the surveillance of mobile communications.96 The Court held that the program
was in violation of Russia's human rights obligations. 97 Russia has since
moved to counteract the judgment with domestic legislation, indicating its re-
sistance to the application of human rights norms to intelligence gathering.98
France has typically complied with judgments holding it liable for extra-
territorial human rights abuses. 99 It is further a robust proponent for privacy
rights both territorially and extraterritorially. 1 00 This, however, recently
changed due to the mass shootings in Paris in November 2015.101 In response,
France derogated from basic privacy protections to increase the scope of all
forms of surveillance programs.102
In sum, the United States appears to be leading a movement of state prac-
tice away from a more robust understanding of human rights privacy. This
movement was partly on display in recent action by the United Nations General
93. See Sonya Sceats with Shaun Breslin, China and the International Human Rights System,
CHATHAM HOUSE (Oct. 2012), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/
Research/International%20Law/rl 012_sceatsbreslin.pdf (discussing China's position).
94. Fry, supra note 54, 37 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 419, 480 (2015).
95. See China: Ratify Key International Human Rights Treaty, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 8,
2013), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/08/china-ratify-key-intemational-human-rights-treaty (noting
that "China is the only country among the permanent members of the UN Security Council not to have
joined the ICCPR").
96. See Roman Zakharov v. Russia, App. No. 47143/06 (Eur. Ct. H. R. Dec. 4, 2015).
97. Id. For a discussion of the decision, see Gabor Rona & Lauren Aarons, State Responsibil-
ity to Respect, Protect, and Fulfill Human Rights Obligations in Cyberspace, 8 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. &
POL'Y 503, 527-28 (2016) (discussing the importance of the case for cyber security law).
98. See Russia Passes Law to Overrule European Human Rights Court, BBC (Dec. 4, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35007059 ("Russia has adopted a law allowing it to overrule
judgements from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The vote in the Duma, Russia's lower
house of parliament, came the same day as the ECtHR ruled against Russia's Federal Security Service
over spying.").
99. See Medvedyev v. France, App. No. 3394/03, 2010-H1 Eur. Ct. H.R.; see also Hathaway,
supra note 85, at 405-06 (discussing the case).
100. See Mark Scott, France Rejects Google's Efforts to Limit Application of Privacy Ruling,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/france-rejects-googles-efforts-
to-limit-application-of-privacy-ruling/ (discussing Google's compliance with privacy protections and
French regulatory responses).
101. For a discussion of the shootings as well as the initial French response, see Fr6dbric G.
Sourgens, The End of Law: The ISIL Case Study for a Comprehensive Theory of Lawlessness, 39
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 355, 420 (2015).
102. Schwen, supra note 26.
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Assembly in passing a resolution on The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age.1 03
On its face, this resolution strongly supports privacy rights in cyberspace and
urges states to protect privacy rights online in the same manner as they do of-
fline. 104 It further notes the potential danger of dragnet intelligence gather-
ing.o Importantly, however, the resolution omitted language included in an
earlier draft asserting that human rights obligations (and thus the right to priva-
cy) apply extraterritorially.1 06 It was this move that permitted the United States
and Russia to support the resolution's ultimate passage.io7 As such, the resolu-
tion expresses concern and calls upon states to act, but stops short of supporting
a broader conception of privacy rights against foreign cyber-surveillance opera-
tions. This issue thus remains unresolved and arguably unresolvable by any
source of law relying directly on outward looking state practice to supply nor-
mative force.
The composition of the group led by the United States is structurally sig-
nificant. It includes four of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council. os Each of these permanent members has a veto right with regard to
any proposed Security Council resolution.' 09 Enforcement of decisions of U.N.
judicial organs by constitutional design require U.N. Security Council action,
subject to the veto powers of the permanent members.110 Given that the United
States is leading a super-majority of U.N. Security Council permanent mem-
bers, the view apparent in their collective conduct structurally (if not formally)
trumps the contrary interpretation of human rights law announced by the ICJ.II
This current positioning has practical implications. In order to vindicate
the existence of privacy rights vis-A-vis the United States (and consequently,
the NSA) or the super-majority of U.N. Security Council permanent members,
one needs to look beyond the human rights treaty paradigm.112 One needs to
find an alternative way to theorize privacy protections so as to open up a sec-
ond front from which to chip away at standing objections that no global privacy
103. G.A. Res 68/167, Resolution on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age (Jan. 21, 2014).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Alex Grigsby, UN Committee Adopts Resolution on the Right to Privacy in the Digi-
tal Age, COUNCIL FOR. REL. (Dec. 1, 2014), http://blogs.cfr.org/cyber/2014/12/01/un-committee-adopts-
resolution-on-right-to-privacy-in-the-digital-age/ ("Like last year, the first draft also implied that states'
human rights obligations extend beyond their borders and jurisdiction, a position which is hotly contest-
ed.").
107. Id. ("It is likely that the sponsors didn't want to needlessly antagonize Russia, which is
one of the few countries that protested the NetMundial outcome and is one of Brazil's BRICS partners,"
and that "these references [to extraterritoriality] probably constituted redlines for the Five Eyes that were
removed or amended into softer language to achieve consensus on the final text."). The drafting history
is also recounted in Milanovic, supra note 23, at 84-86.
108. See Current Members of the United Nations Security Council,
http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/ (last visited July 26, 2016).
109. U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶ 3.
110. Id. art. 94, 12.
111. See supra note 96.
112. See U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of
the United States of America, J 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 (2014) (voicing the U.S. objection
that human rights to not apply extraterritorially and thus to the NSA's global programs).
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right exists. 113 Advancing the privacy argument requires a means to "over-
determine" the right to privacy."l 4 One must show that the United States and
others like it not only ought to recognize the virtue of human rights and respect
global privacy rights, but that they have already committed themselves to such
international privacy norms beyond the human rights context. 15
4. The Value of the Human Rights Discourse
The human rights privacy discourse has significant normative value. Pri-
vacy is an indispensable condition for processes constituting social personality
and civility to form in a manner consistent with human dignity. " We need the
possibility of respite and meaningful remove from autri, both intimately and
personally, in order to engage each other civilly and publicly." 7 Without priva-
cy, there is no room for deliberation or autonomy and thus ultimately no space
for social engagement. 18
The problem might well be put in terms consistent with a photo-negative
of Wittgenstein's private language argument. 119 The private language argument
presents us with the aporia that personal expression in language can never be
completely private because it requires the use of public idiom to be intelligi-
ble. 120 But the reverse is also true: meaning in public discourse requires re-
sistance, friction, against the public idiom to generate new contributions and
thus permit a conversation to continue.121
For persons to create this friction requires privacy or remove because
meaningful resistance requires both deliberation and courage.122 It requires
courage as each act of resistance puts our dignity at stake: to err in public is to
suffer ridicule and ostracism.123 It requires deliberation as each accepted con-
tribution bestows dignity upon us from our respective communities and each
rejected deliberate contribution bestows a sense of integrity and self-worth even
if, in extreme cases, through potential tragic choice.1 24
113. Id.
114. See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 293 (2005) (describing an argument as overdetermined if it draws
upon inconsistent premises of normative state obligation and descriptive state consent).
115. Id.
116. See Post, supra note 19, at 1006-07.
117. See id at 973-74.
118. See id.
119. 1 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, WERKAUSGABE 356 (Suhrkamp Verlag ed., 1984) (setting out
the private language argument).
120. See id. For a discussion of the aporia, see Frederic G. Sourgens, Functions of Freedom:
Privacy, Autonomy, Dignity, and the Transnational Legal Process, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 471,
516-17 (2015).
121. See I NIKLAS LUHMANN, THEORY OF SOCIETY 11, 45 (Rhodes Barrett trans., 2012) (not-
ing the importance of resistance for communication and explaining how such resistance operates upon
communication as the unity of difference between information, utterance, and understanding).
122. See id. at 36 (discussing the volitional component of communication).
123. See Whitman, supra note 18, at 1206 (discussing the importance of social ridicule for
French privacy law).
124. The link between tragic choice, dignity, and public action is still clearly at the forefront of
late classical historical literature. See TACITUS, THE HISTORIES 4 (D.S. Levene ed., W.H. Fyfe trans.,
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Discourse participants therefore must be able to test and formulate their
respective discourse contributions. Without it, they could not participate in
conversation at all.1 25 Language without privacy thus risks leading to inverse
aporia of Wittgenstein's private language argument: a conversation without
speakers is just as meaningless as a speaker without language.1 26
The breaking of privacy, which the world society faces in the current se-
curity climate, risks halting the possibility of engagement as it chills the ability
to form thoughts, opinions, and expressions with which to engage in public dis-
course.127 Firm privacy protections are therefore needed to protect any possibil-
ity of social interaction as well as the dignity of its participants.12 Law-
including world law-ought to aspire to this goal.129 The endeavor of human
rights law is therefore worthwhile to pursue despite the formal problems it has
encountered. As such, the Privacy Principle seeks to support, rather than to
denigrate, its efforts.
B. Unlikelihood oflImpending Treaty Codification
Current non-human rights treaty practice does not provide a ready alterna-
tive basis to fill the gap left by state practice under existing human rights trea-
ties. There is no treaty governing surveillance or intelligence gathering out-
right.130 As the two examples below showcase, existing treaties have failed to
bring about findings that extraterritorial intelligence activities had international
legal consequences for the state on whose behalf they were carried out.
In one instance, Iran sought to rely upon a defense that intelligence opera-
tions carried out from the premises of an embassy deprived the premises of
otherwise applicable diplomatic protections.1 3 1 The ICJ rejected this argument
as a matter of law, noting simply that the remedy for assertions of espionage or
interference by a foreign diplomat in internal affairs of the receiving state is
expulsion of the diplomat as persona non grata.132 Little can be made of this
1997) ("[D]istinguished men bravely facing the utmost straights and matching in their end the famous
deaths of older times.").
125. See Frd&ric G. Sourgens, Reconstructing International Law as Common Law, 47 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REv. 1, 25-29 (2015).
126. See LUHMANN, supra note 121, at 81-83 (discussing the role of surprise and nonfinality of
communication).
127. See Sourgens, supra note 120, at 516-17.
128. See Post, supra note 19, at 1006-07.
129. See 2 HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE
SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 737-86 (1992).
130. Dieter Fleck, Individual and State Responsibility for Intelligence Gathering, 28 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 687, 690 (2007) ("The fact that no explicit treaty norms address peacetime espionage is para-
doxical in light of the enormous amount of intelligence activities and their relevance for international
relations between states.").
131. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 35
(May 24) (noting Iranian arguments on the role of the U.S. embassy in "espionage and conspiracy").
132. Id. at 38-39 (rejecting that espionage directed from the premises of the embassy, if estab-
lished, "could be regarded by the Court as constituting a justification of Iran's conduct and thus a de-
fence to the United States' claims in the present case").
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holding to tease out an international legal prohibition of espionage or a global
privacy right.1 33
In another instance, a Cypriot investor in Turkey argued that Turkish sig-
nals intelligence intercepts of his calls with his U.S. arbitration counsel con-
cerning matters against the Turkish government violated international law.134
Although the tribunal recognized that the communications were privileged, and
excluded any privileged communication obtained through intercepts from the
arbitration record, it recognized the state's right to conduct criminal investiga-
tions and did not deem the intercept of privileged communications internation-
ally wrongful.1 35
Further, it is highly unlikely that agreement on a treaty governing signals
intelligence could be reached in the near future.' 36 To be meaningful, states
with significant signals intelligence capabilities would need to consent to re-
stricting the use of intelligence assets. 137 Given the current global security cli-
mate, and the asserted use of signals intelligence to limit terrorist attacks, it is
unlikely that would happen. 138
Proponents of a treaty structure may point to efforts such as the U.S.-EU
Privacy Shield or the Five Eyes Agreement as some treaty practice to the con-
trary. The U.S.-EU Privacy Shield is a principally commercial mechanism
permitting commercial parties to certify compliance with transatlantic privacy
regimes.1 39 The Privacy Shield became a necessity when a recent European
court ruling that NSA government access to data under PRISM, as revealed by
Edward Snowden, meant that the transfer of data by European companies to
U.S.-based servers would place them out of compliance with EU privacy direc-
tives. 140 Due to language in the Safe Harbor Principles permitting access to da-
ta as needed for national security purposes, existing Safe Harbor Principles
were deemed to no longer satisfy minimum requirements of EU law.141
The problems with the Privacy Shield remain significant. First, the Priva-
cy Shield retained much of the language at issue in the original Safe Harbor
regulation-national security remains a reason to access data.142 The Privacy
133. Fleck, supra note 130, at 691 ("The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has not taken a
position on the issue of peacetime espionage, although it has had the opportunity to do so on a few occa-
sions.").
134. Libananco Holdings Co. Limited v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8, De-
cision on Preliminary Issues, 1 43 (June 23, 2008) (discussing intercept of privileged communication by
a state party to ongoing legal proceedings).
135. Id. 1 82 (ordering the protection of privilege).
136. Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Counterintuitive: Intelligence Operations and International
Law, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 625, 625 (2007) ("Proposals for international treaties to govern intelligence
collection are not only premature, but will likely prove counterproductive to the goal of promoting inter-
national peace and stability.").
137. See id. at 628 (arguing that espionage is both "necessary for the national security of a
nation-state" and "part of the sovereign right of the nation-state").
138. See Savage, supra note 24.
139. See Kristina Daugirdas & Julia Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of United
States Relating to International Laws, 110 AM. J. INT'L L. 347, 360 (2016) (describing the scope of the
Privacy Shield agreement).
140. Id. at 362-63.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 364-65 (noting the limitations of the Privacy Shield).
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Shield provides Ombudsman services to address any complaints raised with re-
gard to data access. 143 The structure does not appear to impose any obligations
on the U.S. or the EU to conduct intelligence in a certain manner-nor does it
provide for a review mechanism to ascertain whether intelligence operations in
fact comply with such an agreement. 144
Second, the Privacy Shield is a political agreement.1 45 The Trump Ad-
ministration may already have taken steps to undermine its purpose with recent
executive action.146 The mechanism, in other words, is not sufficiently robust to
provide long-term assurances of compliance. While a helpful step, it is certain-
ly not the final step in providing for privacy protection for global data transfers.
Other agreements like the Five Eyes Agreement are even less likely to
yield constraints. Privacy International notes that "[t]he Five Eyes alliance is a
secretive, global surveillance arrangement of States comprised of the U.S. Na-
tional Security Agency (NSA), the United Kingdom's Government Communi-
cations Headquarters (GCHQ), Canada's Communications Security Establish-
ment Canada (CSEC), the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), and New
Zealand's Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB)."1 47 While
the agreement does appear to provide for some agreement to restrain from spy-
ing on citizens of the participating states,148 it is unlikely to prove a particularly
fruitful avenue for privacy protection.1 49 For one, the agreement itself is still
partly secret; o it is thus anathema to current formal modes of international
law.s For another, it is premised upon political and bureaucratic agreement
rather than legal enforcement,' 52 and it, too, is thus likely to suffer as admin-
istrations strike more or less nationalist cords.
In short, reliance upon future codification in treaty law is unlikely to re-
solve the normative question of how to protect privacy rights in the digital age.
Treaty practice can offer some normative direction of what might be desirable.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 367 (discussing the sufficiency of the Privacy Shield under existing European juris-
prudence giving rise to it).
145. Id. at 360. On the use and (lack of) legal force of such agreements, see Ryan Harrington,
A Remedy for Congressional Exclusion from Contemporary International Agreement Making, 118 W.
VA. L. REV. 1211, 1225 (2016).
146. Natasha Lomos, Trump Order Strips Privacy Rights from Non-U.S. Citizens, Could Nix
EU-US Data Flows, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 26, 2017), http://techcrunch.com/2017/01/26/trump-order-
strips-privacy-rights-from-non-u-s-citizens-could-nix-eu-us-data-flows/.
147. The Five Eyes, PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL, http://www.privacyinternational.org/node/51
(last visited Apr. 15, 2017). The Five Eyes agreement structures intelligence cooperation and establishes
accepted behavioral norms and practices among the allied intelligence services of the United States,
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Although this arrangement, the contents of
which are not public, may not contribute heavily to the creation of international norms regarding foreign
surveillance, the original U.K.-U.S. Agreement (UKUSA) from which the Five Eyes agreement derives
details the types of communications that each state is to collect and treats as impermissible some uses of
those communications.




152. Daniel Severson, Note, American Surveillance of Non-US. Persons: Why New Privacy
Protections Offer Only Cosmetic Change, 56 HARv. INT'L L.J. 465, 509-10 (2015) (discussing the sui
generis nature of the Five Eyes agreement).
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It cannot, however, fully close the gap of getting from normative desire to a
means to secure legal compulsion.
C. Problems with a Customary Approach
Customary international law is similarly unlikely to fill the normative gap
identified so far. Proof of a customary international law rule would require a
showing that: (1) there is a widespread and representative state practice, and (2)
this practice was brought about by a sense of legal obligation rather than con-
venience.1 53 Intuitively, persistent and aggressive global signals intelligence
efforts will make it difficult to find significant state practice prohibiting its
154
use.
Current literature confirms this intuitive insight. There is no firm custom-
ary rule enjoining states from using espionage in wartime.'55 At most, interna-
tional humanitarian law governing international armed conflicts treats wartime
espionage as a tolerable delict: it neither enjoins the use of espionage on the in-
ternational plane nor prohibits the trial of spies caught red-handed and out of
uniform in domestic court for the domestic law crime of espionage.1 56
There is even less legal certainty regarding espionage in peacetime. 5 7 At
most, international law prohibits trespass (rather than espionage), and thus does
not deal with technologically advanced forms of signals intelligence that can be
performed remotely. 158 The derivation of any customary international law rule
protecting privacy rights in wartime or in peace is therefore decidedly frag-
ile. 159
153. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 146, 149-50 (1987)
(suggesting that state practice and opinio juris are factors on a sliding scale rather than true elements of
custom); Timothy Meyer, Codifying Custom, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 995, 1002-03 (2012) (defining the ele-
ments of customary international law and noting their difficulty in application).
154. See Jeffrey H. Smith, Keynote Address, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 543, 544-45 (2007) (noting
the longstanding state practice of the United States to engage in electronic surveillance to support its
lawfulness).
155. See Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came in From the Cold War: Intelligence and In-
ternational Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1071, 1077 (2006) ("[I]nconsistencies have led some commenta-
tors to conclude that addressing the legality of intelligence gathering under international law is all but
oxymoronic."); Ingrid Delupis, Foreign Warships and Immunity for Espionage, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 53,
67 (1987) ("Most writers claim that espionage in war is 'legal,' although the unfortunate spy himself
may be executed if not in uniform.").
156. See Geoffrey Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
321, 337-38 (1996) (discussing "the paradoxical nature of espionage as a delict").
157. See Chesterman, supra note 155, at 1087 (noting that the response to the signals intelli-
gence intercepts of diplomatic correspondence "has tended to be pragmatic rather than normative"). The
classic distinction is between intelligence gathering that trespasses upon sovereign territory of the state
subject to espionage, which is prohibited, and intelligence gathering done without trespass. Id. at 1081-
87. Some commentators have doubted the usefulness of the distinction, arguing instead that espionage in
peacetime violates international law and that trespass aggravates the violation. Delupis, supra note 155,
at 67-68.
158. See Chesterman, supra note 155, at 1081-87 (setting out the classic trespass / non-trespass
distinction). Some commentators have doubted the usefulness of the distinction, arguing instead that
espionage in peacetime violates international law and that trespass aggravates the violation. Delupis,
supra note 156, at 67-68.
159. See Chesterman, supra note 155, at 1087.
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Some submit that this state of international law makes any kind of espio-
nage-including signals intelligence-presumptively lawful.160 This view re-
lies upon the so-called Lotus principle announced by the Permanent Court of
International Justice in a case between France and Turkey.161 This principle
provides that conduct is internationally permissible unless expressly prohibited
by a rule of international law.1 62 These scholars submit that the absence of an
international legal rule prohibiting signals intelligence provides its legality.1 63
This view is on the whole disfavored in current international law scholar-
ship.1 64 Rather, much of the scholarship focusing beyond the human rights par-
adigm submit that states through their conduct have to develop some context-
sensitive international policy prescriptions on intelligence gathering.165 As
scholarship shows, there is overlap among global signal intelligence programs,
as well as overlap among the statutes authorizing them.166 An inductive, histor-
ical approach to intelligence gathering efforts could further place such pro-
grams in a better context.167 This scholarship is likely to yield a more concrete
picture of the process of decision making governing the institution and admin-
istration of global intelligence gathering programs.168 Signals intelligence, in
other words, does not operate in a complete international legal vacuum.169
Other attempts to grapple with customary international law aided by a
human rights lens have also encountered significant difficulty. One such at-
tempt is the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Operations.170 The Tallinn Manual 2.0 seeks to find a customary international
160. See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 28, at 19 (noting the point of view of a few
experts "that the extensive State practice of conducting espionage on the target State's territory has cre-
ated an exception to the generally accepted premise that non-consensual activities attributable to a State
while physically present on another's territory violate sovereignty" and applying this exception to extra-
territorial signals intelligence operations); Adams, supra note 29, at 403-04 (2017) (applying the Lotus
principle); Craig Forcese, Pragmatism and Principle: Intelligence Agencies and International Law, 102
VA. L. REv. ONLINE 67, 73 (2016) (discussing the relevance of the Lotus principle for the international
law of espionage); Raul Pedrozo, Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: East Asia Focus,
90 INT'L L. STUD. 514, 528 (2014) (same).
161. Forcese, supra note 160, at 73.
162. Id.
163. Adams, supra note 29, at 403-04; Pedrozo, supra note 160, at 528.
164. Forcese, supra note 160, at 69 ("There is, therefore, no principled basis to conclude that
covert action per se falls into an area in which, to quote the famous S.S Lotus case, states are permitted a
'wide measure of discretion.').
165. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, THE QUEST FOR WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS AND INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENT 177-90 (2012) (dis-
tinguishing a textual rule-based mode and a context-sensitive policy-based mode of international law).
166. See Deeks, supra note 61, at 343-45 (arguing that international policy guidance can be
derived from domestic surveillance statutes); Deeks, supra note 89, at 28-36 (submitting that domestic
statutes provide one predicate for peer constraint in the intelligence community).
167. See Asaf Lubin, Book Note (JACKSON MAOGOTO, TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW ON THE
USE OF FORCE: NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014)), 40 YALE J.
INT'L L. 441, 443-44 (2015) (demanding a more context-driven approach to espionage in international
law).
168. See sources cited supra notes 164, 166.
169. See REISMAN, supra note 165, at 21 (noting the reach of law to the "offshore" zones of
international law).
170. See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 28, at 170-71, 189-93, 203-07.
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law basis for the human right to privacy.17 1 This approach looks to the dual pil-
lars of reasonable expectation of seclusion and intimacy of information already
discussed in the human rights context.172 The approach expands that the confi-
dentiality of communications protects email communications even in the ab-
sence of sensitive information within the email communication, thus establish-
ing a per se rule for email communication.' 7 3 The Tallinn Manual 2.0, howev-
however, already crystalizes key problems for such a customary international
law approach. First, it notes that "a number of States that accept the existence
of the right take the position that it does not apply extraterritorially."1 74 This
would significantly limit the relevance of customary international law for the
current inquiry. Second, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 notes in general that "[t]he Ex-
perts were incapable of achieving consensus as to whether remote cyber espio-
nage reaching a particular threshold of severity violates international law," thus
foreclosing an alternative means of dealing with extraterritorial surveillance by
looking at its severity.'
Similarly, the United Nations Human Rights Council appointed a special
rapporteur to address internet privacy concerns raised by bulk cyber surveil-
lance in the context of the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of
opinion and expression.1 76 The special rapporteur concluded the existence of a
human rights obligation to protect privacy rights online.' 77 Like the Tallinn
Manual 2.0, however, the most recent report notes that "practice often fails to
meet such standards," noting particularly Russian, French, UK, and Brazilian
conduct that is arguably inconsistent with the obligations induced by the Spe-
cial Rapporteur.178 Such state practice significantly complicates any argument
that a customary international law rule prohibiting online, extraterritorial intru-
sions of privacy has crystallized. 1
171. Id. at 187, 189 (suggesting in Rule 35 that "[i]ndividuals enjoy the same intemational hu-
man rights with respect to cyber-related activities that they otherwise enjoy" and that this rule is appli-
cable to cyber privacy, which is "of a customary intemational law character").
172. Id. at 191-92.
173. Id. at 189-90.
174. Id. at 189.
175. Id. at 170.
176. See G.A. Res. 25/A/HRC/25/L.2, Freedom of Opinion and Expression: Mandate of the
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression
(Mar. 4, 2014) (setting the mandate for the Special Rapporteur).
177. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, f/20, U.N. Doc. A/71/373 (Sept. 6, 2016) (by David Kaye).
178. Id.
179. For another such attempt, see International Principles on the Application of Human
Rights to Communications Surveillance, NECESSARY & PROPORTIONATE (May 2014),
https://necessaryandproportionate.org/principles. Problematically, this attempt, too, notes that "many
govemments routinely engage in bulk surveillance of intemational communications with very little re-
gard for the privacy of those communications, possibly in the mistaken belief that their legal obligations
only extend as far as their own citizens or residents. Even more problematically, it appears that countries
seek intelligence-sharing arrangements with other countries in order to obtain surveillance material con-
ceming their own citizens that they could not obtain under their domestic legal framework." Background
and Supporting International Legal Analysis fbr the International Principles for the Application of Hu-





As many proponents of such context-sensitive prescriptions would them-
selves admit, however, the principles they develop are "soft." 180 These princi-
ples can guide state conduct but cannot compel it.' 8 ' They are helpful in in-
forming policy making of when and how to spy; 82 they are decidedly less
valuable to those spied upon in developing legal support for the proposition that
existing or future efforts are internationally wrongful.1 83 Such support would
have to be developed by other means, if it can be developed at all.
II. PROVING GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW
As the remainder of this Article will submit, the current state of interna-
tional law requires a paradigm shift. The traditional sources of international law
discussed so far have been called "oxymoronic."' 84 They suggest the existence
of norms to limit global signals intelligence programs. But they ultimately fail
to convincingly substantiate a path to integrate these norms into international
law. Perhaps symptomatically, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 reports in the context of
an attempt to ground privacy protections in customary international law that
"the Experts concluded that, notwithstanding State practice, espionage remains
subject to States' applicable human rights law obligation to respect the right to
privacy." 1s Custom without state practice will prove difficult to defend on any-
thing but the hope that the principle proposed has sufficient normative pull to
bring about future compliance.1 86 Given the current security environment, it is
not likely that such state practice will be forthcoming, thus limiting the argu-
ment for a customary international rule of online privacy. It is therefore time to
consider whether a less traditional source of international law is able to over-
come the obstacles faced in treaty practice and custom.
As the Article will develop, general principles of law recognized by civi-
lized nations succeed in closing the normative gap on signals intelligence left
open by other sources of international law. General principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations are the third formal source of international law
alongside treaty law and customary international law.187 Although used with
significantly less frequency than the other formal sources of international law,
general principles of law were specifically intended to address areas under-
developed by treaty law and custom.188 The function of general principles of
180. See Decks, supra note 61, at 343-45 (noting the limitations of the approach to provide




184. Chesterman, supra note 155, at 1077.
185. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 28, at 193 (emphasis added).
186. See Kirgis, supra note 153, at 149-50 (discussing how custom could be created in the
context of opinio juris with very limited state practice).
187. See Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L
L. 413, 425 (1987) (listing as "formal sources of international law: conventions, custom, general princi-
ples of law").
188. See Prosper Weil, "The Court Cannot Conclude Definitively . . " Non Liquet Revisited,
36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 109, 111 (1997) (noting ICJ practice to use general principles of law in
limited circumstances when faced with disputes in underdeveloped areas of law).
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law, in other words, is to fill gaps within the fabric of international law.' 89 This
is precisely the state of the law on signals intelligence. 190
Although general principles of law functionally are gap fillers, they are
formally sources of general international law co-equal with treaty law and cus-
tom.191 A general principle of law is not a subsidiary source of law.1 92 It is not
less authoritative than other sources of international law.1 93 Proof of a general
principle therefore can provide a robust basis for an international legal right
even in the absence of treaty or customary law.1 94 In fact, that is the very pur-
pose for which general principles were included as a formal source of intema-
tional law. 195
A. Proof of a Principle
Proof of a general principle of law recognized by civilized nations in in-
ternational law classically has two components. First, one must prove that a
general principle of law exists at all. Does comparative legal analysis of rele-
vant legal systems establish a requisite degree of convergence to formulate a
common, shared legal principle of domestic laws? It is not necessary to show
universal support; rather, one must demonstrate "[s]ome sort of general ac-
ceptance or recognition by States." 96 Such principles recognized in jurispru-
dence include a broad range of principles, from joint and several liability for a
wrong committed, to imposing obligations of good faith, to the consequences
of res judicata in international adjudication.1 97
Second, one must prove that this common, shared principle of domestic
laws is compatible with existing norms of general international law. Does pub-
lic international legal analysis of relevant analogous international legal norms
establish the requisite degree of convergence with the common, shared legal
189. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 31, at 93; Roberto G. McLean, Judicial Discretion in the Civ-
il Law, 43 LA. L. REV. 45, 52-54 (1982) (noting the predominant civil law jurisdictions in which general
principles of law have a similar function).
190. Chesterman, supra note 155, at 1077.
191. Rosalyn Higgins, Keynote Address, A Just World Under Law, 100 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 388, 391 (2006) ("[T]here is no hierarchy as such between sources of international law.").
192. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33
U.N.T.S. 993; see also Steven Schneebaum, What Is This Case Doing Here? Human Rights Litigation in
the Courts of the United States, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 183, 195-96 (2011) (discussing the primary
sources of international law).
193. PATRICK DAILLER & ALAIN PELLET, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 348 (7th ed. 2002)
(grounding general principles as a source of international law); Higgins, supra note 192, at 391
("[Tlhere is no hierarchy as such between sources of international law."). But see ULRICH FASTENRATH,
LLfCKEN IM VOLKERRECHT 101-02 (1991) (arguing that general principles of law are not positively
grounded in state consent or practice).
194. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 31, at 93-96 (discussing the importance of general princi-
ples in absence of other sources of international law).
195. BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 1-26 (2006) (discussing the reason for inclusion of general principles of law as a source of
international law).
196. See Nolan & Sourgens, supra note 31, at 525-28 (cataloguing general principles recently
recognized in jurisprudence).
197. See Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Co-
gens, and General Principles, 12 AUST. Y.B. INT'LL. 82, 102 (1989).
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principle of domestic laws to permit the seamless incorporation of the general
principle in question? This is an essentially inductive process of legal reason-
i 198
mg.
An alternative way to conceive of proof of a general principle is through
deductive reasoning.199 This approach assumes that international law has a core
or essence beyond summing up every rule of positive treaty or customary
law.2 00 When a problem cannot be answered by means of one of these rules,
general principles can close the gap by analogy.201 In this case, a general prin-
ciple projects a rule that must be applicable to the new problem by extending
the logic of existing international law.202 Such an analysis short circuits the
need to prove inductively that a privacy principle exists by pointing to the
overwhelming support among legal publicists that a human rights principle of
privacy must apply to global surveillance programs notwithstanding state prac-
tice to the contrary.203
In fact, in their seminal article on the use of general principles in the hu-
man rights context, Bruno Simma and Philip Alston suggest just such a course
of action by looking to the importance of the principle for international law as
expressed for instance in UN General Assembly resolutions. 204 This method
therefore would yield a general principle by looking to the sources treated as
indicative of custom. This Article nevertheless attempts to prove inductively
that this essentialist principle actually obtains as a classically derived general
principle of law. In so doing, it aims to cement inductively the existence of a
robust privacy right in international law. 205
This Section addresses the first component of the classical way to prove a
general principle. The question of whether comparative legal analysis of rele-
vant legal systems establishes the requisite degree of convergence to formulate
a common, shared legal principle can be broken into three parts.206 First, how
does one select relevant legal systems? 207 Second, by what means does one
198. For a fuller articulation of the distinction between deductive and inductive reasoning in
international law, see Fr6d6ric G. Sourgens, Reconstructing International Law as Common Law, 47
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1, 25-29 (2015).
199. Id. A deductive approach is one way to present an essentialist argument. It assumes in
essence that there is one right answer to any legal problem due to the essence of law or legal process.
Law in this sense would emulate Spinoza's Ethics. See Aaron Garrett, Spinoza as Natural Lawyer, 25
CARDOzO L. REV. 627, 634-35 (2003) (discussing the deductive, fixed mode of natural law for Spinoza).
200. See CHENG, supra note 195, at 3-19 (discussing the essentialist-naturalist view of general
principles of law).
201. See James L. Dennis, Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and the Evalua-
tion ofJudicial Precedent, 54 LA. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1993) (discussing the use of analogy in civil code
jurisdictions).
202. Id.
203. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 28.
204. Simma & Alston, supra note 197, at 105; see also Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Im-
portance of Customary International Human Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 14-15 (1996)
(discussing Simma & Alston's approach).
205. This attempt is also intended to overcome the concern, expressed already by Simma and
Alston, that general principles are plagued by a natural law flavor. See Lillich, supra note 204, at 15;
Simma & Alston, supra note 197, at 107.
206. For a full discussion, see Nolan & Sourgens, supra note 31, at 506.
207. Id.
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identify convergences in selected legal systems? 208 Third, how much conver-
gence is required to establish that the jurisdictions share a common general
principle? 209
1. Method for Selecting Legal Systems to Be Examined
Proof of a general principle does not require an examination of every le-
gal system in the world.210 Typically, the ICJ has limited its own comparative
legal analysis to three to five legal systems. 2 11 Alternatively, the Court has re-
lied upon comparative studies prepared by leading academics.212
The selection of legal systems has been controversial. Historically, gen-
eral principles were established by comparing leading common law and Euro-
pean civil law jurisdictions.213 This historical practice has been criticized as too
narrowly drawn because it fails to account for legal systems of the developing
world.214 Current best practices therefore have broadened to include non-
Western jurisdictions.215
The selection of jurisdictions will be most persuasive if it takes the key
stakeholders' jurisdictions affected by the principle to be proved into ac-
count. 216 The stronger the link between the principle and the state to whom the
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. For a full review of 1.C.J. jurisprudence and recent arbitral decisions, see Nolan & Sour-
gens, supra note 31, at 525-28 (working methodically through recent decisions).
211. See, e.g., Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 1.C.J. 161, 324, 354-57 (Nov. 6) (separate
opinion by Simma, J.) (relying upon French, Swiss, German, Californian, and Canadian law); "); Oil
Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Counter-Claim, 1998 I.C.J. 190, 224, 230-31 (Mar. 10) (dissenting opinion by
Rigaux, J.) (relying upon French, Belgian, and European Communities law); North Sea Continental
Shelf (Federal Republic of Ger. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 101, 121-22 (Feb. 20) (separate opinion by Am-
moun, J.) (relying upon "the concept of estoppel by conduct of Anglo-American equity, or by virtue of
the principle of western law that allegans contraria non audiendus est, which has its parallel in Muslim
law"); Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9, 34, 49-50 (July 6) (separate opinion by
Lauterpacht, J.) (relying upon French, English, and American law).
212. See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Beig. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 30, 114,
155 (Feb. 5) (separate opinion of Tanaka, J.) (relying upon a comparative legal analysis compiled by the
Max-Planck Institute); Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 12, 54, 66
(Apr. 12) (separate opinion of Koo, J.) (relying upon "a comparative study by Professor Max Rhein-
stein").
213. Wolfgang Friedmann, The Use of "General Principles" in the Development ofInterna-
tional Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 279, 285 (1963) ("[T]he relevant principles of the most representative
systems of the common-law and the civil- law world" are constitutive of general principles of law).
214. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 101, 132 (Feb. 20)
(separate opinion of Ammoun, J.) (noting the colonial remnants in general principles of "civilized" na-
tions and advocating a broader scope to establish general principles); VLADIMIR DEGAN, SOURCES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 70 (1997) (same).
215. See Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention (Libya v. U.S.), 1998
I.C.J. 115, 155, 171 (Feb. 27) (dissenting opinion of Schwebel, J.) (rejecting judicial review as a general
principle of law due to its restriction to developed democracies); Desert Line Projects LLC v. Republic
of Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17, Award, ¶ 207 (Feb. 6, 2008) (referring to Islamic law in estab-
lishing a general principle of law).
216. See Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 1.C.J. 6, 44 (Apr. 12)
(stating that specific practice between states dispenses with the need to have regard for customary inter-
national law or general principles of law); see also DEGAN, supra note 214, at 71-75.
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principle is to be applied, the greater the principle's ultimate legitimacy will
be. 2 17
2. Choice of Comparative Law Methodology
The ICJ has employed two comparative law methodologies when proving
a general principle of law. First, the Court has looked to the "formal" overlap
between the legal systems analyzed. 218 The Court's formal analysis compared
the text of applicable statutes and seminal cases and further consulted treatises
or commentary authoritatively interpreting the jurisdiction's black letter law. 219
For example, Judge Simma in a separate opinion in the Oil Platforms Case es-
tablished a general principle of joint and several liability by comparing the code
provisions applicable to delictual liability of the French, Swiss, and German
Civil Codes and seminal cases of U.S. tort law, as well as their interpretation in
the leading treatises on the law of obligations and tort law. 220
Alternatively, the Court has directly or indirectly relied upon a functional
comparative methodology.221 Functional analysis does not look to the conver-
gence of black letter rules, but to the convergence of outcomes in hypothetical
222case scenarios. The benefit of functional analysis is to limit the risk of false
negatives when two jurisdictions achieve similar results by different legal
paths. 223 It also limits the risk of false positives when two jurisdictions apply
facially similar legal principles in radically different ways in practice. 224 Func-
tional legal comparison has become the predominant method used by compara-
tive legal scholars when codifying transnational law or harmonizing laws of re-
gional trading blocs such as the European Union.225
The approaches used by the Court suggest that proof of a general princi-
ple should begin with a formal comparison.226 This formal comparison should
217. See supra notes 169-71.
218. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 324, 354-58 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion of
Simma, J.) (consulting leading commentators and seminal cases on tort/delict law); Oil Platforms (Iran
v. U.S.), Counter-Claim Order, 1998 I.C.J. 190, 224, 230 (Mar. 10) (dissenting opinion of Rigaux, J.)
(relying upon concordant code provisions); Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9, 34, 49-50 (July
6) (separate opinion of Lauterpacht, J.) (consulting leading treatises on French, English and American
law of contracts).
219. See supra note 173.
220. Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J. at 161, 324, 354-58 (separate opinion of Simma, J.) (consulting
leading commentators and seminal cases on tort/delict law).
221. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 114, 155 (Feb. 5)
(separate opinion by Tanaka, J.) (relying upon a comparative legal analysis compiled by the Max-Planck
institute); North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 101122 (Feb. 20) (separate opin-
ion of Ammoun, J.) (comparing Anglo-American equity with civilian good faith and civilian good faith
as received in Muslim countries); Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 12,
54, 68 (Apr. 12) (separate opinion of Koo, J.) (relying upon "a comparative study by Professor Max
Rheinstein").
222. See supra note 176.
223. Id.
224. Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law I 39 AM. J.
COMP. L. 1, 24 (1991).
225. Reinhard Zimmermann & Simon Whittaker, Good Faith in European Contract Law:
Surveying the Legal Landscape, in GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 39-40 (Reinhard Zim-
mermann & Simon Whittaker eds. 2008).
226. See sources cited supra note 173.
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then be checked for potential false positives or false negatives by applying a
functional comparison, as well.227 The result will be a nuanced and robust un-
derstanding of convergence consistent with both the Court's jurisprudence and
comparative law best practices. 228
3. The Criterion of Critical Mass
The Court has established general principles even in the absence of com-
plete agreement between major legal systems. Some of the Court's pronounce-
ments on general principles may give the false impression that complete
agreement is necessary.229 Such pronouncements are inconsistent with the
Court's jurisprudence. 230 Thus, the Court has relied upon good faith as a gen-
eral principle of law since its earliest jurisprudence. 231 Early international juris-
prudence held that good faith required both honesty and fact and reasonable
conduct.232 At the time of the Court's establishment of such an expansive prin-
ciple, however, neither English nor U.S. common law recognized the existence
of such an expansive good faith principle.233
Instead of relying on a standard of complete agreement, the appropriate
standard of convergence is critical mass. The requirement for convergence in
general principles has been likened to the requirement of convergence in the
proof of a customary international law rule.234 Current scholarship usefully
analyzes the convergence necessary for the establishment of a customary rule
235by reference to critical mass.
Critical mass refers to a transformative point of criticality - in our con-
text, the point at which a principle of law ceases to be parochial to any number
of legal systems and becomes a common and shared general principle of law.236
227. See sources cited supra note 176.
228. See sources cited supra note 173-76.
229. See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 286, 324
(separate opinion of Ammoun, J.) (noting that the notion of "abuse of right" is "enshrined in a general
principle of law which emerges from the legal systems of all nations"); North Sea Continental Shelf
(F.R.G. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 21 (Feb. 20) ("[T]he principle of the just and equitable share was one of
the recognized general principles of law which, by virtue of paragraph I (c) of the same Article, the
Court was entitled to apply as a matter of the justitia distributiva which entered into all legal systems.");
Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 123, 136 (Apr. 12) (dissenting opinion
of Ferrandes, J.) (noting that "the laws of all civilized nations recognize the right of access to enclaved
property in favour of its owner").
230. Friedmann, supra note 213, at 284 (stating that "it is not necessary that the principles
should be found to exist in identical form in every system of civilized law").
231. CHENG, supra note 195, at 105-60.
232. Id.
233. Dennis M. Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of Good Faith Performance
and Enforcement Under Article 9, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 335, 381 (1988) (discussing the limited role of
good faith in pre-1950s U.S. contract law); Zimmermann & Whittaker, supra note 225, at 39-40 (dis-
cussing the lack of a good faith principle in the English law of contract).
234. Simma & Alston, supra note 197, at 105.
235. See, e.g., Adeno Addis, The Concept of Critical Mass in Legal Discourse, 29 CARDOZO L.
REv. 97, 145 (2007) (using critical mass to analyze custom formation); Steven R. Ratner, Is Internation-
al Law Impartial?, 11 LEGAL THEORY 39, 57 (2005); William Thomas Worster, The Transformation of
Quantity into Quality: Critical Mass in the Formation of Customary International Law, 31 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 1, 56-71 (2013) (using critical mass to analyze custom formation).
236. Addis, supra note 235, at 104.
[Vol. 42:2372
The Privacy Principle
This point of criticality "is actually not just a matter of the amount of resource,
but also of the density and purity of that resource." 237
Critical mass scholarship is helpful in three principal ways when deter-
mining the sufficiency of convergence between legal systems to establish a
general principle. First, it has shown that criticality is not a precise measure.238
There is no number or percentage of agreement that itself will yield criticali-
ty.239 Critical mass looks to establish whether the quantity has begun a qualita-
tive shift or chain reaction.240 Critical mass therefore requires both quantitative
and qualitative engagement.241
242Further, density and purity matter. Critical mass will look to the densi-
ty of agreement between the studied jurisdictions.24 3 Convergence, or diver-
gence, is never absolute.244 Rather, there will be a difference in density of func-
tional convergence: how many legal systems treat an intrusion in the home as
wrongful? How many jurisdictions extend liability to correspond? The denser
the agreement on outcomes between jurisdictions, the stronger the case for a
general principle.245 Further, the purity of agreement-for example, whether
jurisdictions in fact agree upon a rationale for liability-similarly matters to
critical mass.246 In the absence of an overlap in rationale, a greater density of
agreement may well be required to establish a general principle and vice versa.
Finally, diversity matters. To arrive at a critical mass, the broader the
support among legal traditions, the stronger a claim that a principle is in fact
"general." 247 The diverse converging jurisdictions serve as agents towards a
tipping point of increasing acceptance of the principle in question. 248 Critical
mass denotes the point of criticality at which that tipping point has been
reached or passed.249 A broad coalition of converging jurisdictions crossing le-
gal, regional, and developmental boundaries is more likely to reflect a tipping
point than a narrow coalition.250 The broader the diversity, the greater the
237. Id.
238. Id. at 127.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 104.
241. Id. at 127.
242. Id. at 104.
243. Id. at 104.
244. See KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE LEX MERCATORIA 47
(1999) (explaining how to deal with divergence in establishing general principles).
245. Addis, supra note 235, at 104.
246. Compare BERGER, supra note 244, at 47 (noting the steps required to overcome doctrinal
divergence in establishing general principles), with Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 324,
354-58 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion of Simma, J.) (establishing a general principle in the context of com-
parative doctrinal convergence).
247. See DEGAN, supra note 214, at 70 (noting the need for diversity in establishing general
principles); Christopher A. Ford, Judicial Discretion in International Jurisprudence: Article 38(1)(c)
and "General Principles ofLaw, " 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 35, 65 (1994) (same).
248. See Worster, supra note 235, at 56-58.
249. See Addis, supra note 235, at 104.
250. See DEGAN, supra note 214, at 70 (noting the need for diversity in establishing general
principles); Ford, supra note 248, at 65 (same).
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chance of adoption of the principle by other, similarly situated jurisdictions. 251
In fact, one can assess whether there is movement within the dissenting juris-
diction towards convergence with the majority of jurisdictions in question-
i.e., whether a chain reaction towards the general principle is currently under-
252
way.
B. Integration into International Law
The fact that a general principle exists does not mean that it forms part of
international law. 253 Rather, general principles of law must also satisfy a further
requirement of compatibility with existing general international law.254
Two leading English judges of the ICJ have explained the relationship be-
tween general principles of domestic law and international law. Judge Fitzmau-
rice noted in his separate opinion in Barcelona Traction that "it is scarcely less
important to bear in mind that conditions in the international field are some-
times very different from what they are in the domestic, and that rules which
these latter conditions fully justify may be less capable of vindication if strictly
applied when transposed on to the international level." 255 Judge McNair further
submitted in his concurring opinion in the South West Africa advisory opinion
that "the way in which international law borrows from [general principles of
law] is not by importing private law lock, stock, and barrel, ready-made and
fully equipped with a set of rules." 256 Rather, "the true view of the duty of in-
ternational tribunals in this matter is to regard any features or terminology
which are reminiscent of the rules and institutions of private law as an indica-
tion of policy and principles rather than as directly importing these rules and
institutions."257
The jurisprudence of the Court indicates that any principle must be com-
pared with existing rules of international law. To the extent that the principle
would outright displace existing rules of international law, a general principle
cannot exist.258 In other words, in such a context, the general principle would
not fulfill its function to fill gaps in international law, but would instead create
259
new gaps.
251. See Addis, supra note 235, at 127-28 (discussing a similar development in the context of
political agendas).
252. Nolan & Sourgens, supra note 31, at 510-13, 521-22.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 66 (Feb. 5)
(separate opinion of Fitzmaurice, J.).
256. International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 148 (July
11) (separate opinion of McNair, J.); see Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 1951-1954: General Principles and Sources of Law, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1,
18-19 (1953) (discussing the separate opinion of McNair, J.); see also Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at
66 n.4 (Feb. 5) (separate opinion of Fitzmaurice, J.) (supporting the analysis of general principles by
McNair, J.).
257. South West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. at 148 (separate opinion of McNair, J.).
258. Fitzmaurice, supra note 256, at 22 ("[I]t must be assumed that Article 38 was intended to
recite or place on record only those elements which, under existing international law, were already mate-
rial to any decision purporting to be given 'in accordance with international law."').
259. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 31, at 93.
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The jurisprudence of the Court means further that any principle should al-
so be compared to analogous rules of international law. If there is significant
convergence between analogous rules of international law and the general prin-
ciple to be introduced, adoption of the general principle as part of international
law would truly fill a gap.260 It would extend the logic of existing prescriptions
to an area that remains underdeveloped in international law. 261 This extension
would be consistent with reasonable state expectations precisely because it does
not impose truly new obligations.262 Rather, it gives full effect to the meaning
of existing international legal obligations.263
III. THE PRIVACY PRINCIPLE
The remainder of the Article is devoted to proving the Privacy Principle.
Section III.A will first address the choice of sources for establishing the Priva-
cy Principle. It will next show that a critical mass of these source jurisdictions
suggest that invasion of privacy is tortious conduct. It will confirm and
strengthen this principle through a functional legal comparison of the legal sys-
tems examined. It will also argue that the Privacy Principle should be adopted
as part of international law because of the yet under-determined contours of the
law of espionage and the theoretical coherence of the Privacy Principle with
human rights law.
The latter portion of this Part will establish that the Privacy Principle can
rely upon a consistent definition of privacy from domestic law and that the do-
mestic law definition of privacy is consistent with policies underlying interna-
tional law. Finally, the last Section will supply the scope of permissible state
intrusion into privacy on the basis of the private law principle of necessity and
the international legal principle of proportionality.
A. Selection ofLegal Systems
The first step to prove the existence of a general principle is to select
sources for examination. The Article will look to the laws of the United States,
France, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, Iran, and Isra-
el. These jurisdictions capture a reasonable diversity in legal traditions,264 cover
a broad geographic range, and encompass a significant cultural diversity. 265
260. See id.
261. South West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. at 148 (separate opinion of McNair, J.).
262. Fitzmaurice, supra note 256, at 22.
263. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 31, at 93.
264. See H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY
IN LAW 266 (2010) ("Common law thinking retains a vital place in U.S. law."); id. at 147 (noting the
place of France in the spectrum of civil law jurisdictions); id. at 349-50 ("Just as communism had to
bend to deep-rooted east Asian thought, however, so too is western-style law clearly the object of confu-
cianization, as filtered through communist authority [in the People's Republic of China]."); Tamar
Gidron, Israel, in MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY 577, 578 (Vernon
Palmer ed., 2012) ("Israeli private law has moved considerably from its common law origin and may
now be classified as primarily reflecting concepts that derive from the civil law world."); A.L. Makov-
sky, Preface to the English Translation of THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, at xlix, Ii
(Peter Maggs & A.N. Zhiltsov eds. & trans. 1997) ("The new Civil Code neither repeats nor copies the
civil and commercial codes and statutes of other countries. It has its own 'personality,' with its own vir-
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This choice of jurisdictions is by no means exhaustive. It is driven by an
examination of representative legal systems equipped with significant signals
intelligence capabilities.266 An agreement among these global leaders is going
to carry the greatest authority vis-a-vis possible repeat offenders against the
principle in question. 267 It is also the likely source of the most engagement with
privacy questions at the domestic level given the availability of sophisticated
technology to these states and the private residents under their jurisdiction.268
The principle developed below will be drawn from the private law of the
legal systems examined. This focus upon private law comparison differs from
the predominant focus upon public law in signals intelligence scholarship.269
The choice of private law is consistent with the generation of a significant
number of general principles in recent jurisprudence of the International Court
of Justice.270 Historically, many if not most general principles had some Roman
civil law derivation. 271 The focus upon private law therefore has pedigree.
It is further important that for understandable policy reasons, public law
forays into regulating surveillance-particularly extraterritorial surveillance-
have been comparatively weak in generating robust protections. 272 The state
has an understandable interest in reducing barriers to its own intelligence col-
lection. There being no constituents to complain about foreign data collection,
* * 273
ordinary democratic checks on governmental overreach are at a minimum.
tues and vices."); William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and Uncod-
ified), 60 LA. L. REV. 677, 679 (2000) (listing Iran as a "mixed jurisdiction . . .partly derived from non-
occidental legal traditions").
265. See sources cited supra note 264.
266. Nicole Perlroth, Google Says It Has Uncovered Iranian Spy Campaign, N.Y. TIMES (June
12, 2013, 6:36 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/google-says-it-has-uncovered-iranian-
spy-campaign/ (describing sophistication of Iranian internet surveillance capabilities); see also Henry
Porter, The West is Moving Towards China in Its Quest for Mass Surveillance, OBSERVER (June 8,
2013), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/08/west-china-mass-surveillance (discuss-
ing the size of US and Chinese surveillance efforts); David Shamah, Israeli Authorities Use Far Wider
Surveillance Powers than Those Causing Storm in US, TIMES OF ISRAEL (June 9, 2013),
http://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-authorities-use-far-wider-surveillance-powers-than-those-causing-
storm-in-us/ (describing scope of Israeli signals intelligence); Shaun Walker, Russian Data Law Fuels
Web Surveillance Fears, GUARDIAN (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/
sep/Ol/russia-intemet-privacy-laws-control-web; Kim Willsher, France Approves 'Big Brother' Surveil-
lance Powers Despite UN Concern, GUARDIAN (July 24, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/24/france-big-brother-surveillance-powers (describing
French signals intelligence programs).
267. See Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6, 44 (Apr. 12)
(stating that specific practice between states dispenses with the need to have regard for customary inter-
national law or general principles of law); Nolan & Sourgens, supra note 31, at 510 (discussing same).
268. See sources cited supra note 229.
269. See Deeks, supra note 61, at 343-45 (arguing that intemational policy guidance can be
derived from domestic surveillance statutes); Deeks, supra note 89, at 28-36 (submitting that domestic
statutes provide one predicate for peer constraint in the intelligence community).
270. See Nolan & Sourgens, supra note 31, at 525-28 (cataloguing recent jurisprudence).
271. See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 54 (1991) (not-
ing cynically that "expressing tautologies in Latin apparently adds to their weight in judicial reason-
ing"); Randall Lesaffer, Argument from Roman Law in Current International Law: Occupation and Ac-
quisitive Prescription, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 25, 29 (2005) (noting the intended private law grounding of
general principles of law).
272. See sources cited supra note 269.
273. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Why Administrative Law Misunderstands How Government
Works: The Missing Institutional Analysis, 53 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 12-13 (2013) (discussing the link be-
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Public law on this issue is therefore the least neutral means to assist in formu-
lating a principled approach for much the same reason that nemo iudex in pro-
pria sua causa: the state is simply not a disinterested or otherwise accountable
actor with regard to foreign intelligence gathering.274
This lack of accountability has functional consequences. The right of
people to exclude the state from their personal affairs is typically governed by
public law: criminal procedure, authorizing statutes, and administrative regula-
275tion. Police powers permit the state to intrude into the personal affairs of its
subjects far more readily than would otherwise be allowed in orderly civil rela-
tions.276 The state's broader margin of action under public law relies upon a
functional premise: the state acts in the public interest, including the interest of
the people intruded upon, to keep the public safe.277
This functional premise fails when the state acts extraterritorially with re-
gard to foreign nationals. The state no longer acts in the public interest: the in-
terest of those intruded upon as well as the public at large. 278 The state acts in
self-interest when spying upon foreigners in a foreign land.279 The state does
not seek to protect the foreigner, nor would it have any jurisdiction to do so.280
It seeks to protect only (or at least principally) itself and its subjects. 281
When the state acts beyond its own territory, beyond its right to regulate,
it slips into the position of everyman. The state's actions no longer benefit from
regulatory right.282 Extraterritorial conduct of the state is thus not a priori per-
missible as sovereign prerogative,283 but nor is it a priori impermissible as in-
tween democratic accountability and administrative law posited in some U.S. administrative law schol-
arship).
274. See CHENG, supra note 195, at 284 (discussing the rationale for the general principle).
275. See Orin S. Kerr, A Rule of Lenity for National Security Surveillance Law, 100 VA. L.
REV. 1513, 1538 (2014) (noting the public law nature of surveillance laws); Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibri-
um-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 487 (2011) [hereinafter Kerr,
Equilibrium] (arguing that "judges adjust Fourth Amendment protection to restore the preexisting level
of police power").
276. Kimberly N. Brown, Anonymity, Faceprints, and the Constitution, 21 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 409, 425 (2014).
277. Id.
278. Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in American Federalism,
150 U. PA. L. REv. 855, 878-82 (2002) (tethering the extraterritorial reach of police powers to state citi-
zenship in the U.S. due process context).
279. See, e.g., Jim Michaels, NSA Chief Surveillance Programs Protect Americans, USA
TODAY (June 13, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/06/12/alexander-nsa-cyber-
snowden/2415217/ (quoting the former Director of the National Security Agency, General Keith Alex-
ander as saying "I think what we're doing to protect American citizens here is the right thing").
280. Compare Ronald J. Sievert, War on Terrorism or Global Law Enforcement Operation?,
78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 307, 348 (2003) (discussing the scope of territorial, passive personality and
protective principle jurisdiction), with JAMES R. CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 462 (8th ed. 2012) ("Ultimately, the identification of exorbitant jurisdiction may
be a matter of knowing it when one sees it.").
281. See citations supra note 238.
282. See citations supra note 233.
283. See Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information Operations,
II LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1023, 1035-36 (2007) (noting the broad rejection of the Lotus principle in
state practice).
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terference in the internal affairs of its neighbors. 284 Rather, in the absence of a
treaty or customary international law rule on point, the conduct is governed by
the same principles of lawful intercourse in civil society and thus should be
subject to civil law. 285
Pragmatically, two concerns should further weigh in favor of a choice of
private law. First, private law and public law on privacy are typically correlat-
ed. Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren's article on The Right to Privacy radiat-
ed both in constitutional law and tort law in the U.S. and beyond.286 Many of
the regimes discussed below straddle the private/public law divide. As the state
is more disinterested in the regulation of private intercourse, private law may
frequently be a step ahead of public law in articulating liability rules for unwar-
ranted intrusions into privacy. But the logic of private law, as Brandeis and
Warren's article proves, is similarly at work in the public law setting.287
Second, looming in the background is the question of whether it makes a
difference to distinguish between state and non-state actors in cyberspace.288
One need not be a state to have significant hacking capabilities.289 And states
frequently hide behind non-state actors to deny involvement in their cyber mis-
290deeds. A private law premise for a general principle can easily serve as a
baseline for broader transnational codification efforts. 29 1 These efforts would
promise to regulate more than just state (mis)conduct. The Article harbors the
hope to develop such a broader transnational framework in the future.
B. A Formal Right To Privacy
A formal comparison of the legal systems of the United States, France,
the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, Israel, and Iran strong-
ly supports the existence of a general principle of law. As discussed below, five
of these legal systems expressly recognize a right to privacy as a matter of their
private law, and one appears to be moving towards recognizing a privacy right.
This overlap in the formal acceptance of a right to privacy as such in pri-
vate law is significant for critical mass. It suggests not only that there is signifi-
284. See Forcese, supra note 44, at 201 (noting the lack of judicial support or state practice to
support that spying in general is an unlawful interference in internal affairs).
285. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 31, at 93.
286. See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 156 (2007) ("[B]oth Botsford and Brandeis's views of Fourth
Amendment privacy were later used by the Court to help fashion the constitutional 'right to privacy.' In
Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade, the Court relied on the ideas first articulated in Warren and
Brandeis's article to articulate the scope of the constitutional protection of privacy rights. Warren and
Brandeis's conception of privacy thus did not just influence the privacy torts; it also had a wide-ranging
effect on the law of privacy more generally.") (internal citations omitted).
287. Id.
288. See Mark Pomerleau, State vs. Non-State Hackers: Diferent Tactics, Equal Threat?, DEF.
SYS. (Aug. 17, 2015), https://defensesystems.com/articles/2015/08/17/cyber-state-vs-non-state-haclers-
tactics.aspx (discussing state and non-state hacking threats to the U.S.).
289. Id.
290. David E. Sanger & Charlie Savage, U.S. Says Russia Directed Hacks to Influence Elec-
tions, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/us/politics/us-formally-accuses-
russia-of-stealing-dnc-emails.html.
291. BERGER, supra note 244, at 71.
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cant quantitative support for a privacy right, but also that the support materially
overlaps in rationale. In terms of critical mass terminology, the convergence
between legal systems has a high degree of doctrinal purity. Convergence with
a high degree of purity is probative of the existence of a Privacy Principle.
1. Legal Systems Recognizing a Private Law Right to Privacy
Comparative law scholarship on privacy rights in the civil liability con-
text confirms the near global agreement on the existence of a privacy right in
domestic private law.292 Formal comparison of the legal systems chosen as the
baseline for this Article confirms this conclusion. Particularly, the domestic
private laws of the United States, France, Russia, Israel, and China each recog-
nize a right to privacy.
U.S. private law protects privacy by imposing civil liability for invasions
of privacy.293 U.S. common law premises such tort liability upon a distinct
right to privacy. 294 The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides the most au-
thoritative statement on the right of privacy in U.S. tort law.295 The Restate-
ment approach has been adopted by the predominant civil law jurisdiction in
the United States, Louisiana, through judicial interpretation of the Louisiana
Civil Code.296 The Restatement states as follows:
(1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability
for the resulting harm to the interests of the other.
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated in §
652B; or
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness, as stated in § 652C; or
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life, as stated in §
652D; or
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the
public, as stated in § 652E.297
The French Civil Code, like U.S. law, recognizes an explicit right to pri-
vacy.298 The French Civil Code, unlike the Louisiana Civil Code, protects pri-
292. See GERT BROGGEMEIER, MODERNISING CIVIL LIABILITY LAW IN EUROPE, CHINA,
BRAzLu, AND RUSSIA: TEXTS AND COMMENTARIES 33 (2011) ("[N]owadays, despite remaining differ-
ences in individual instances, there is broad consensus on the protection of personality interests in civil
liability law... . Privacy ('the right to be left alone') has become another key area of protection of the
persona by liability law.").
293. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 10.2 (2d ed. 2016) (noting the influ-
ence of the Prosser classification); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (setting
out the four-fold division of the tort of privacy).
294. See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195
(1890) (theorizing the right to privacy as a tort law right).
295. See Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 907 (2009) ("Over
the course of the twentieth century, and under the helpful influence of William Prosser, author of the
relevant sections of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, nearly all states have recognized some
branches of the tort right of privacy.").
296. See Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal, Inc., 375 So. 2d 1386, 1388-89 (La. 1979). For a
discussion of current Louisiana law on point, see Patrick N. Broyles, Comment, Intercontinental Identi-
ty: The Right to the Identity in the Louisiana Civil Code, 65 LA. L. REV. 823, 848-63 (2005).
297. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-E (1977).
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vacy by express codification rather than through the general provision on de-
lictual liability. 299 Article 9 of the Civil Code states as follows:
Everyone has a right to the respect of her private life.
Judges may, without prejudice to compensation for damages suffered, or-
der all measures appropriate to enjoin or put to an end the violation of the inti-
macy of private life; these measures, if urgent, can be ordered by one judge sit-
ting in chambers.3
The post-Soviet Russian codification project similarly included a privacy
protection since its very inception. This privacy protection, too, is couched as a
right.301 Article 150.1 of the Russian Civil Code provides:
The life and health, the personal dignity and personal immunity, the hon-
our and good name, the business reputation, the immunity of private life, the
personal and family secret, the right of a free movement, of the choice of the
place of stay and residence, the right to the name, the copyright and the other
personal non-property rights and non-material values, possessed by the citizen
since his birth or by force of the law, shall be inalienable and untransferable in
any other way.302
Israeli law incorporates privacy protection in private law through special
legislation. The 1981 Protection of Privacy Law recognizes a right to priva-
cy.303 It makes infringement of privacy a civil wrong.304 In relevant part, it cre-
ates liability for
(1) spying or trailing a person in a manner likely to harass him, or
any other harassment;
(2) listening prohibited under the Law;
(3) photographing a person while he is in a private domain;
(5) copying the contents of a letter or other scripts not intended for publi-
cation, or the use of contents thereof, without the permission of the addressee
or the writer, unless the script is of historical value and no more than fifteen
298. See Jeanne M. Hauch, Protecting Private Facts in France: The Warren & Brandeis Tort
is Alive and Well and Flourishing in Paris, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1219, 1231-42 (1994) (discussing the his-
torical development of French civil law on privacy).
299. Compare CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] at c (Fr.) (Dalloz 2015) (summarizing cur-
rent jurisprudence on the right to privacy), with Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal, Inc., 375 So. 2d 1388-
89 (interpreting the general delictual provision of the Louisiana Civil Code).
300. CODE CIV[L [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art.9 (Fr.).
301. Gadis Gadzhiev, The Constitutionality of Civil Law Norms, in PRIVATE AND CIVIL LAW
IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 91 (William Simons ed., 2009) (including the right to privacy in the civil
rights codified as part of the 1993 Russian Civil Code).
302. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIlSKOI FEDERAISII [GK] [CIVIL CODE] art. 150.1 (Russ.)
(emphasis added).
303. See Tamar Gidron, The Publicity Right in Israel: An Example of Mixed Origins, Values,
Rules, Interests and Branches ofLaw, 12 STELLENBOSCH L.R. 405, 407 (2007).
304. Protection of Privacy Law, 5741-1981 SH No. 1011, art. 4 (Isr.), available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file -id=347462 ("An infringement of privacy constitutes a civil
wrong, and the provisions of the Torts Ordinance [New Version] shall apply therein, subject to the pro-
visions of this Ordinance."); see also Usama Halabi, Legal Analysis and Critique of Some Surveillance
Methods Used by Israel, in SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL IN ISRAEL/PALESTINE: POPULATION,




years have passed since the time when it was written; for this purpose, script -
including an electronic message as defined in the electronic signature Law,
5761-2001;
(7) infringement of duty of confidentiality prescribed by law in respect of
a persons private affairs;
(9) use or passing on of information on a persons private affairs, for a
purpose other than which was prescribed;
(10) publication of or the passing of anything that was obtained by way of
an infringement of privacy under paragraphs (1) to (7) or (9);
(11) publication of any matter that relates to a persons intimate life, in-
cluding his sexual history, or state of health or conduct in the private do-
*305
main.
Finally, Chinese law since the 2009 adoption of the Tort Law has incor-
porated privacy protections in its private law.306 Privacy protections again are
couched in terms of an underlying privacy right. 307 Article 2 of the law states:
Those who infringe upon civil rights and interests shall be subject to the
tort liability according to this Law.
"Civil rights and interests" used in this Law shall include the right to life,
the right to health, the right to name, the right to reputation, the right to honor,
right to self image, right of privacy, marital autonomy, guardianship, owner-
ship, usufruct, security interest, copyright, patent right, exclusive right to use a
trademark, right to discovery, equities, right of succession, and other personal
and property rights and interests. 308
2. The Iranian Outlier
Iran is an outlier jurisdiction in its treatment of privacy. As it stands, Ira-
nian private law does not recognize a broad right to privacy as part of the civil
305. Protection of Privacy Law (Isr.), supra note 304, art. 2, translated in Israel Protection of
Privacy Law, 5741-1981, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=347462 (last visited
Apr. 14, 2017).
306. See Ann Bartow, Privacy Laws and Privacy Levers: Online Surveillance Versus Eco-
nomic Development in the People's Republic of China, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 853, 854-56 (2013) (discussing
the historical development of privacy law in China); Bo Zhao, Posthumous Reputation and Posthumous
Privacy in China: The Dead, the Law, the Social Transition, 39 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 269, 284 (2014)
(discussing the history and context of the provision).
307. See Jingzhou Tao & Gregory Louvel, Latest Trends in Cloud Computing in China, 15
No. 9 ELEC. BANKING L. & COM. REP. 12, 2 (2012) ("China's Tort Law recognizes the right to privacy
as a stand-alone legal principle."); Zhao, supra note 306, at 284. But see Bartow, supra note 306, at 863
(treating privacy as a referenced concept rather than a right in Article 2).
308. Qinquan Zeren Fa, Tort Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's
Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010) (China), translated in Tort Law ofthe People's Republic of
China, THE STATE COUNCIL, http://english.gov.cn/archive/laws-regulations/2014/08
/23/content_281474983043584.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2017).
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code.309 Further, Iran so far has not introduced private law statutory protections
apart from the civil code directly protecting privacy rights. 310
Despite this outlier status of Iran, it appears that Iran is moving towards
the recognition of a right to privacy in private law. 311 As discussed in more de-
tail in the context of functional legal comparison, Islamic law recognizes key
principles central to the right to privacy. 312 Scholarship increasingly treats these
313
concepts as part and in the language of a broader privacy right.
3. Conclusion
Formal legal analysis showcases a significant convergence on the exist-
ence of privacy protections as a general principle of law. Significantly, the legal
systems studied conceive of privacy as a right. This right to privacy has support
from a diversity of legal traditions, including common law, civil law, and
mixed jurisdictions. There is no regional trend rejecting the right to privacy.
Cultural diversity between legal systems studied is not an impediment to the
adoption of a right to privacy. All of this supports that the right to privacy is,
indeed, a general principle of private law.
C. Functional Comparison
As discussed above, formal legal comparison is not in itself sufficient to
support a general principle of law. Rather, it is necessary to establish by means
of functional comparison whether the convergence of legal systems established
on the basis of formal legal comparison provide a false positive. Further, func-
tional comparison can increase the density of convergence by focusing upon
specific functional problem solutions adopted by the various legal systems
studied-as opposed to looking exclusively to legal form.
In this case, the need for functional comparison is made greater by the
broad nature of the Privacy Principle itself. Relevant to the purpose of this Ar-
ticle, the mere fact that a Privacy Principle exists does not necessarily mean
that it prohibits surveillance or that it prohibits the use of private information
once gathered. These narrower questions require a functional comparison of the
legal systems studied.
309. QANUNI MADANI [CIVIL CODE] Tehran 1314 [1935] (Iran).
310. See Mohammad Habibi Mojandeh, Privacy in Islam and Iranian Law (Nov. 30, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript) (British Institute of Int'l & Comparative Law Workshop on Privacy),
www.biicl.org/files/3198_dr-habibi-presentation.doc (last visited Apr. 14, 2017).
311. Id.
312. See, e.g., Sadiq Reza, Islam's Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure in Islamic Doctrine
and Muslim Practice, 40 GEO. J. INT'L L. 703, 792-95 (2009) (laying out a privacy theory of Islamic
law); Kristen Stilt, Islamic Law and the Making & Remaking of the Iraqi Legal System, 36 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REV. 695, 697 (2004) ("Islamic law is the supreme law of the land in Iran.").
313. See, e.g., Ansari Bagher, Protection of Privacy in Islam and Iran's Legal System (Com-
parative Study), 2005 L.Q. J. FAC. L. & POL'Y SCI. 1 (2005) (introducing a privacy right rationale to
Iranian law); Kamal Halili Hassan & Parviz Bagheri, Data Privacy in Electronic Commerce: Analyzing





1. The Potential False Positive
The comparative analysis so far has hidden from view that the right to
privacy in the private law of the legal systems studied varies significantly from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Two functional divergences are particularly signifi-
cant. First, while there is convergence upon the existence of a right to privacy,
legal systems differ significantly upon the function of this right. Second, and as
a natural result of the different function of the right to privacy in the legal sys-
tems studied, the standards according to which liability for violation of the right
to privacy are established also differ greatly. Both of these differences raise the
potential that formal analysis of the right to privacy in private law leads to a
false positive.
First, a functional analysis of the place of privacy in the private law of the
legal systems studied reveals three different rationales for the privacy right. In
some jurisdictions, privacy functions as a negative right.3 14 The right to privacy
exists only because of a corresponding prohibition or duty. 315 By analogy, traf-
fic rules provide a coherent set of duties on all motorists that coherently allow
one to derive a right of reasonable safe-travel on public streets-the right to be
free from unsafe driving by others, not to drive unimpeded.3 16 The United
States' treatment of privacy paradigmatically treats privacy as such a negative
right. 1  The essence of the right to privacy is the prohibition of others to in-
trude. " Liability then is premised upon some form of intentional conduct or
fault in intruding.3 19 Of the legal systems studied, the United States, Israel, and
China adopt this rationale. 320
In some jurisdictions, privacy functions as a form of right of autonomy.321
The point of privacy is not to keep others out so much as to have a right in
one's personhood.32 2 French law is firmly part of this tradition by treating pri-
vacy as a moral right, part and parcel of personhood itself 323 The practical con-
314. See 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 1 (2016) (defining privacy as freedom from intrusion).
315. See Robin West, Rights, Capabilities, and the Good Society, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1901,
1920 (2001) (defining negative right as a "freedom from").
316. See C. Edwin Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and Time,
Place, and Manner Regulations, 78 Nw. L. REv. 937, 1005 (1987) (discussing rights in the context of
traffic rules).
317. See Privacy, supra note 314.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.; Protection of Privacy Law, 5741-1981, S.H. 1011 p. 1284 (Isr.); Qinquan Zeren Fa,
Tort Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1,
2010) (China), translated in Tort Law of the People's Republic of China, THE STATE COUNCIL,
http://english.gov.cn/archive/laws regulations/2014/08/23/content_281474983043584.htm (last visited
Apr. 14, 2017).
321. See Jonathan Kahn, Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance, 33 SETON
HALL L. REV. 371, 381-82 (2003) (discussing the link between privacy and autonomy).
322. See id.
323. See Huw BEVERLY-SMITH ET AL., PRIVACY, PROPERTY, AND PERSONALITY, CIVIL LAW
PERSPECTIVES ON COMMERCIAL APPROPRIATION 152 (2005) ("Privacy belongs to the moral patrimony
of every physical person and constitutes, like his image, the continuation of his personality." (quoting
Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Seine, Jan. 23, 1966, ICP
1966, 11, 14875 (Fr.)).
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sequence is that the right to privacy becomes stronger and inalienable.324 As
one author put it, as a matter of French law, alienating privacy is akin to com-
mitting suicide.325 Of the legal systems studied, French law adopts such a ra-
tionale. 326
Finally, the protection of privacy can be an incidental consequence of lia-
bility imposed upon undesirable conduct. There is a prohibition against intrud-
ing, but it is too dispersed to permit the formulation of a coherent right. By
analogy, the existence of fouls in football is not sufficiently coherent to permit
the formulation of a right not to be injured playing the game.327 This is the ap-
proach of Islamic law.328 Here, privacy protection is at its weakest.
The theoretical difference has significant practical implications. French
law creates an absolute right of privacy. 329 It uses a strict liability regime for
privacy. 330 One example of this approach is that a person retains the right to re-
voke consent for publication of his or her image even after the image has en-
tered into the public domain. 331 U.S. law, on the other hand, does not create
strict liability for invasions of privacy. 332 It looks to intent and fault in deter-
mining liability. 333 Reasonable, not outrageous, invasions of privacy are toler-
334
ated3. One consequence of this approach is that a person can no longer enjoin
the publication of personal information after the information has entered into
the public domain. 335
These differences call into question how robust the convergence of a right
to privacy in private law is. It thus requires a functional appraisal of compara-
tive legal systems. This functional appraisal will need to determine the density
of legal systems studied when addressing specific types of conduct impacting
privacy. 336 In areas of dense convergence, the existence of a privacy principle
can be deduced then not only in theory, but also in its specific meaning and
prescription.
324. See Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 353, 361
(2006) ("[Mloral rights are inalienable in the sense that they can be neither transferred to third parties
nor relinquished altogether.").
325. See Hauch, supra note 298, at 1230 ("The late Professor Desbois felt that an author's
renunciation of the defense of his personality by attempted alienation of his moral rights was tantamount
to a 'moral suicide,' which public policy could not allow.").
326. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 9 (Fr.).
327. See Benedict Carey, Study Focuses on Repeated Hits, Not Concussions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
31, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/01/health/study-focuses-on-repeated-hits-not-
concussions.html.
328. See Reza, supra note 312, at 792-95 (laying out a privacy theory of Islamic law).
329. Hauch, supra note 298, at 1234.
330. Id.
331. Peter Yu, Moral Rights 2.0, 1 TEX. A&M L. REv. 873, 895 (2014) (discussing the moral
right of withdrawal or retraction).
332. Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1805, 1828-29
(2010) (discussing the requirement of conduct 'highly offensive to the reasonable person').
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (pointing in its case
notes to Reuber v. Food Chemical News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 719 (4th Cir. 1991) for the proposition that
"if information is already in the public domain when published by a defendant, it does not qualify as
private facts").
336. Nolan & Sourgens, supra note 31, at 519-22.
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2. Surveillance as Wrongful Invasion ofPrivacy
The first relevant fact scenario concerns surveillance. Do the legal sys-
tems studied treat surveillance conducted without consent by a hacker as a vio-
lation of privacy in private law? This fact scenario most closely resembles ex-
isting signals intelligence programs gathering information either through
reviewing the electronic footprint left by a person's telephone calls as well as in
email and chat rooms, or alternatively using computer cameras to gather intelli-
gence on the person's home. 337
Each of the legal systems examined would treat such surveillance as a vi-
olation of privacy rights under private law. Beginning with the outlier Iurisdic-
tion of Iran, Quranic legal principles prohibit intrusion in the home. 38 They
further prohibit suspicion, spying, and backbiting.. 339 Scholarship has extended
these prohibitions to electronic data and traced them through existing statutory
Iranian provisions addressing data privacy as a matter of public law. 340 All of
these principles can be made actionable under Article 1 of Iran's Civil Liability
Code. 1 The current scholarly developments on data privacy in particular sup-
port that the physical or virtual means of spying is not dispositive in the estab-
lishment of a wrongful act for invasion of privacy.342
U.S. law would treat the hypothetical fact scenario as an intrusion upon
seclusion. 343 As one court applying the intrusion upon seclusion tort in the
cyber context representatively explained:
The elements of a cause of action for invasion of privacy by intrusion on seclusion
or private affairs are: (1) the defendant intentionally intruded on the plaintiffs soli-
337. Glenn Greenwald, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data ofApple, Google and Oth-
ers, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data
("The NSA access is part of a previously undisclosed program called PRISM, which allows officials to
collect material including search history, the content of emails, file transfers and live chats, the docu-
ment says."); Kim Zetter, How to Keep the NSA from Spying Through Your Webcam, WIRED (Mar. 13,
2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/03/webcams-mics/ ("According to The Intercept, the NSA uses a
plug-in called GUMFISH to take over cameras on infected machines and snap photos. Another NSA
plug-in called CAPTIVATEDAUDIENCE hijacks the microphone on targeted computers to record con-
versations.").
338. QURAN 24:27-28 (M.H. Shakir trans.). For a discussion of the legal implications of the
passage, see Reza, supra note 312, at 792-95,
339. QURAN 49:12 (M.H. Shakir trans.). For a discussion of the legal implications of the pas-
sage, see Habibi, supra note 310, at 3-4.
340. Hassan & Bagheri, supra note 313 (citing HAMIDREZA ASLANI, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY LAW (2006)).
341. TASBIT MADANI [CIVIL LIABILITY CODE] Tehran 1960, art. 1 (Iran),
http://policy.mofcom.gov.cn/GlobalLaw/english/flaw!fetch.action?libcode=flaw&id=83a23796-812e-
401c-a516-e543c7675029&classcode=431 ("Any one who injures intentionally or due to his negligence,
the life or health or property or freedom or prestige or commercial fame or any other right established
for the individuals by virtue of law, as a result of which another one sustains materially or spiritually
losses, shall be liable to compensate the damages arising out of his action."). The logic of importing the
shari'a based privacy principle into general tort law follows the logic of civil law courts interpreting
similar provisions in France and Louisiana in the absence of a specific privacy right. See Jaubert v.
Crowley Post-Signal, Inc., 375 So. 2d 1386, 1388-89 (La. 1979); Tribunal de premiere instance [TPI]
[ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Seine, June 16, 1858, D.P. Itt 1858, 52 (also known as the "The
Rachel Affair").
342. Hassan & Bagheri, supra note 313 (citing HAMIDREZA ASLANI, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY LAW (2006)).
343. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 335.
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tude, seclusion, or private affairs, and (2) the intrusion would be highly offensive to
a reasonable person. The court concludes that hacking into a person's private com-
puter and stealing personal correspondence would represent an intentional intrusion
on the victim's private affairs and that such an intrusion would be highly offensive344
to a reasonable person.
Israeli law expressly prohibits intrusion upon seclusion. 345 Following
United States tort law, it does not matter that the intrusion is virtual as opposed
to physical.346 Surveillance operations would meet the fault requirements of Is-
raeli law. 347 The key exception provided for Israeli law concerns intrusion upon
seclusion under color of law. 348 This exception applies only to Israeli govern-
ment actors. 349 Consequently, foreign surveillance activity would violate Israeli
private law.
Chinese privacy protections are treated as significantly less robust than
those protections extended by other jurisdictions. 350 The principal focus of lit-
erature raising this concern is privacy protection of Chinese citizens against
cyber-surveillance by their own government; 351 it thus engages in a public law
focused analysis. 352
The private law focus of the Privacy Principle here is helpful in overcom-
ing this concern: recent codification efforts in China show a clear commitment
to privacy protections in private law. 353 Chinese tort law would treat surveil-
lance activity under the general privacy tort.354 Chinese law does not distin-
guish between virtual and physical conduct, using the term "infringe" as the
predicate of liability. 3 55 Internet-based invasions of privacy are expressly con-
templated invasions of privacy by the law.
Russian privacy protections, just like Chinese privacy protections, are
treated with some skepticism in the literature. 357 Again, this literature tends to
focus on public law-the protection of people in Russia against intrusion into
privacy by their own government. 3 8 The issue again looks different in the con-
344. Coal. for an Airline Passengers' Bill of Rights v. Delta Airlines, 693 F. Supp. 2d 667, 675
(S.D. Tex. 2010).
345. Gidron, supra note 303, at 4.




350. Fry, supra note 54, at 480-81 (discussing the limited privacy protections available as a
matter of Chinese law).
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Qinquan Zeren Fa ,Tort Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010) (China).
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Connie Carabucci & Mark Parsons, E-Commerce in China - How Can You Get a Piece
of the Action?, 14(6) E-CoM. L. REP. 8, 12 (2012) ("Though there is no comprehensive data privacy law
in China at present, the 2010 Tort Law introduced a general right to privacy, including specific rights
against the misuse of personal information on the internet.").
357. See Anupam Chander & Uyin P. L8, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L.J. 677, 701-02
(2015) (discussing recent Russian legislation permitting the FSB to emulate data collection programs




text of private law. Privacy is expressly treated as a non-material value in the
Russian Civil Code. 359 This treatment is analogous to the creation of a moral
right.360 On its face, there appears to be no need to prove intent or fault. 361 Fur-
ther, virtual conduct has been recognized as a violation of the private law pri-
vacy right. 362
Finally, one aspect of French privacy law is its prohibition of intrusion
upon seclusion. 363 This prohibition extends not just to physical but also virtual
reality. 364 So long as the surveillance captures private information, it violates
the broad rights-based approach of French law. 365
In sum, there is complete agreement among the legal systems studied that
virtual surveillance is a potential violation of the privacy right. The core ques-
tion will be whether surveillance captures something private. Further, an inva-
sion of privacy might otherwise be excused as proportionate. As a general rule,
however, there is complete convergence upon a Privacy Principle in private law
considering virtual surveillance activity of private conduct or information as
wrongful.
3. Use ofPrivate Information as Wrongful Invasion ofPrivacy
The next question is whether use of private information is also wrongful.
Is it an additional violation of the Privacy Principle for a hacker to not just
gather information, but to use it as well? The three most likely scenarios for
such actions are the publication of the information obtained, the use of the in-
formation for purposes of blackmail, and identity theft.
All of the jurisdictions examined deem the publication of private infor-
mation or images a private wrong. 366 The core difference between the different
359. GRAZHDANSKIi KODEKS RosslISKOl FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 150.1
(Russ.).
360. See Individual Freedom and Civil Rights, in CIVIL HUMAN RIGHTS IN RUSSIA: MODERN
PROBLEMS OF THEORY AND PRACTICE 47-49 (F. M. Rudinski ed., 2008) (discussing the relationship be-
tween "non-material" rights and values and moral rights in French law).
361. See GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIlSKOi FEDERATSll [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 12
(Russ.) (requiring only proof of violation of the right in question, not the intent or fault of the infringer).
362. See Trevor McDougal, Establishing Russia's Responsibility for Cybercrime Based on its
Hacker Culture, II B.Y.U. INT'L & MGMT. REV. 55, 56-58 (2015) (outlining the existing Russian cy-
bernetic legal regime); Russia, New Privacy Protection Law, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Nov. 5, 2013),
http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/russia-new-privacy-protection-law/ (discussing new priva-
cy law amendments to the Civil Code).
363. See VIRGINIE LARRIBAU-TERNEYRE, DROIT CIVIL, INTRODUCTION BIEN PERSONNE
FAMILLE ¶ 763 (2015) (arguing that respect for private life implies the inviolability of the home and
correspondence; and discussing new privacy law amendments to the Civil Code).
364. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] soc., Oct. 2, 2001, Bull.
civ. V, No. 291 (Fr.) (Nikon Case).
365. Id.
366. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (establishing liability as a matter of U.S.
law); GUOSONG SHAO, INTERNET LAW [N CHINA 161 (2012) (arguing that publication of private facts
without consent creates liability under the right to privacy as a matter of Chinese law); Tamar Gidron,
Privacy Protection as a Case Study in Personal Rights Protection in Israeli Law, 28 COMPUTER L. &
SEC'Y REV. 283, 287 (2012) (discussing Israeli law); Habibi, supra note 310, at 5-6 (establishing liabil-
ity as a matter of Islamic Iranian law); Hauch, supra note 298, at 1246-49 (discussing French law); Scott
Shackelford, Fragile Merchandise: A Comparative Analysis ofthe Privacy Rights of Public Figures, 49
AM. BUS. L.J. 125, 178 (2012) (same); Peter Roudik, Russia: New Privacy Protection Law, LIB. CONG.
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legal systems concerns a situation in which the information was already inde-
367
pendently in the public domain. This distinction is reasonably less important
in the surveillance context-here, the point is to gather and use non-public in-
formation.368 With regard to such non-public information, the legal systems ex-
amined converge upon a general prohibition of publication without consent.369
The use of information for blackmail is similarly wrongful.370 In the
blackmail context, the principal cause of action may not always be one of inva-
sion of privacy. Invasion of privacy would be the appropriate cause of action if
the blackmailer made good on his or her threat and published the information in
question.3 71 If the blackmailer is paid off, theories of unjust enrichment or vio-
lation of duties of good faith may be more appropriate.372
Identity theft similarly is a civil wrong. Increasing the risk for identity
theft (rather than committin identity theft) can be a violation of the right to
privacy actionable in tort.37 Committing identity theft is likely going to be
treated under the heading of fraud or unjust enrichment rather than violation of
the right to privacy.374 Still, the underlying use of private information in the
commission or preparation of identity theft remains a civil wrong.
Consequently, there is significant convergence that the use of private in-
formation is an independent wrongful act in violation of the right to privacy as
conceived in the studied legal systems. Again, what remains to be resolved is
what constitutes "private" information and if there are any affirmative defenses
permitting the use of the information in question without consent. As a general
rule, however, the Privacy Principle would consider the use of the fruits of vir-
tual surveillance activity to be wrongful conduct.
(Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/russia-new-privacy-protection-law/ (dis-
cussing new privacy law amendments to the Civil Code).
367. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) (stating that there is no
liability as a matter of U.S. law if the information is in the public domain), and Gidron, supra note 366,
at 288 (recounting Israeli case law to the same effect), and SHAO, supra note 366, at 161 (stating that
there is no liability as a matter of Chinese law if the information is in the public domain), with Hauch,
supra note 298, at 1246-49 (finding liability under these circumstances under French law), and Scott J.
Shackelford, supra note 366 (same).
368. See Paul Rosenzweig et al., Maintaining America's Ability to Collect Foreign Intelli-
gence: The Section 702 Program, HERITAGE FOUND. (May 13, 2016), http://www.heritage.org/research
/reports/2016/05/maintaining-americas-ability-to-collect-foreign-intelligence-the-section-702-program
(discussing the value of non-public communications intelligence gathered by the U.S.).
369. See sources cited supra note 367.
370. See CHENG, supra note 195, at 148-49 (noting the general principle of vitiating consent
under duress).
371. See sources cited supra note 367.
372. See CHENG, supra note 195, at 148-49 (discussing international legal consequences of
duress as a general principle of law).
373. See Protection of Privacy Law, 5741-1981, SH No. 1011 p. 128, art. 4 (Isr.) (treating con-
fidentiality of database principals as a privacy right); Shqeirat v. U.S. Airways Group, Inc., 515 F. Supp.
2d 984, 998 (D. Minn. 2007) (noting that increasing the risk of identity theft is actionable as a violation
of publication of private facts in U.S. law).
374. See CHENG, supra note 195, at 158 (discussing the general principle of fraud).
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E. Integrating the Privacy Principle in International Law
The Article so far has established the existence of a Privacy Principle in
private law. There is convergence in global private laws upon the existence of a
right to privacy. Even in the face of doctrinal divergence on the meaning of this
right, there is complete convergence among all the legal systems studied that
the surveillance of persons in private is presumptively wrongful. There further
is convergence among the legal systems studied that the use of private infor-
mation-be it to publish the information, blackmail a person with the infor-
mation, or otherwise rely upon the information to the subject's detriment-is an
additional violation of the Privacy Principle.
Although the Article will not define precisely what "privacy" is protected
by the Privacy Principle, it is reasonably clear that the Privacy Principle will
have important ramifications for existing global surveillance programs. 375 Par-
ticularly, programs that rely upon the gathering and analyzing of global "big
data" would be presumptively unlawful.376 Such programs, it is natural to as-
sume and the next Section will confirm, are bound to collect private infor-
mation. The point of these programs is to act upon this information. 77 The Pri-
vacy Principle makes gathering this information and acting upon it
presumptively wrongful.
1. The Fit of the Privacy Principle in International Law
The Privacy Principle, once fully developed, stands to fill the void in the
legal literature identified in Part I. The problem, as expressed by the Group of
Experts drafting the Tallinn Manual 2.0, is how to justify how "notwithstanding
State practice, espionage remains subject to State's applicable human rights
law obligation to respect the right to privacy." 378 As discussed in the context of
customary international law, it is deeply problematic to posit a customary inter-
national law rule "notwithstanding State practice." 379 Similarly, it is questiona-
ble how such human rights treaty obligations might be said to govern extraterri-
torial surveillance programs over the continuous-and structurally
insurmountable-objections of core signatories like the United States and other
permanent members of the UN Security Council discussed above. Finally, ex-
isting treaty-drafting efforts analyzed above also were unlikely to yield mean-
ingful privacy protections either when trying to coordinate intelligence gather-
ing efforts or when seeking to harmonize privacy regimes in the commercial
sector.
375. See Laura Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and In-
ternet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 117, 152-53 (2015) (noting reports on NSA programs).
376. See Margaret Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPP. L.
REv. 773, 803-05 (2015) (discussing the difference between big data and small data surveillance meth-
ods).
377. See Donohue, supra note 375, at 152-53 (discussing current government programs); Hu,
supra note 376, at 803-05 (same).
378. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 28, at 193 (emphasis added).
379. Id.
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The key point of the Privacy Principle is to recognize privacy as a right. It
thus creates protections against intrusion no matter their source. It is no de-
fense, in other words, that one intruded upon seclusion from abroad. The seclu-
sion itself creates the jurisdictional nexus for the Privacy Principle to impose
liability.38 0
The Privacy Principle can and must be integrated into general internation-
al law because it is entirely consistent with existing human rights law and juris-
prudence. The privacy protections extended by the Privacy Principle are analo-
gous to the interpretation of the right to privacy included in human rights
treaties.381 In that context, too, surveillance and use of private information are
deemed presumptively wrongful unless it can be shown that state conduct did
382
not affect private information or was otherwise excused. Given this conver-
gence between the right to privacy in human rights law and the Privacy Princi-
ple, they each are helpful to the establishment of the right to privacy as a gen-
eral principle of international law.383 This principle, importantly, would be
globally applicable no matter the status of ratification of human rights instru-
ments or interpretation of their scope of application.
The Privacy Principle cannot be displaced by reference to customary in-
ternational law. As discussed in Part I, there is no readily available customary
international legal prescription on surveillance. The absence of customary pre-
scription in international law is not license for states to act out the limits of
their physical and technological might with reckless abandon.384 Quite to the
contrary, the lack of treaty or customary prescription with regard to certain
kinds of conduct calls for the establishment of a general principle of law to
385
guide lawful state conduct and rein in sovereign abuse.
The Privacy Principle is finally immune to criticism of legal "Occidental-
ism"-the view that international law imposes pernicious Western individualist
386
values upon the rest of the world. A recent joint declaration by Russia and
the People's Republic of China accused much of international law of such an
occidental bias.387 The two countries instead sought to strengthen sovereign in-
380. Compare Sievert, supra note 280, at 348 (discussing jurisdiction), with BROWNLIE, supra
note 280, at 462 (same).
381. Milanovic, supra note 23, at 137.
382. Id. at 139.
383. Nolan & Sourgens, supra note 31, at 522-23.
384. Compare Adams, supra note 29, at 403-04 (justifying the international legality of intelli-
gence gathering by reference to the absence of a clear prohibition in international law enjoining such
efforts, premised in the Lotus principle), with Abhimanju Jain, The 21" Century Atlantis, 50 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 1, 32 (2014) ("The Lotus principle is now the subject of much criticism and is generally subor-
dinated to the reverse-Lotus principle: that whatever is not permitted by international law is prohibit-
ed.").
385. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 31, at 93 (discussing the purpose of general principles as a
source of international law).
386. Sundhya Pahuja, The Post-Coloniality of International Law, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 459,
461 (2005) (deconstructing Western claims to universal values in international law).
387. The Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on the
Promotion of International Law, RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (June 25, 2016),
http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign-policy/news/-/asset-publisher/cKNonkJEO 2 Bw/content/id/
2 3 3 1698; Lau-
ri M5lksoo, Russia and China Challenge the Western Hegemony in the Interpretation of International
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dependence and autonomy over internal affairs.388 Whatever the merit of the
joint declaration may be with regard to other areas of international legal pre-
scription (and recent Western responses to events in Ukraine and Syria certain-
ly give fodder for vivid disagreement on the role of international law in the
world community), it cannot undercut the right to privacy. This right, as the es-
tablishment of the general principle has shown, is not a figment of the Western
mind. It is a principle that has found support throughout diverse legal cultures
and traditions (including Russia and China) and around the world.38 The Pri-
vacy Principle thus confirms the original aspiration of the right to privacy in
human rights law-it is truly universal, and truly a part of positive international
law.390
2. But Can a General Principle be Substantive?
It remains to tackle a likely objection to the Privacy Principle. It might be
argued that general principles of law are primarily procedural in nature (e.g.,
res judicata). 391 To the extent that a general principle should be recognized be-
yond such procedural rules, one would need to show an unquestionable conver-
gence upon the principle in formulation and application. A Privacy Principle
therefore, critics might argue, falls flat on its face.
Ultimately, the objection is not based in an understanding of general prin-
ciples as they are recognized in international law today. Good faith is the para-
digmatic example of a general principle. 392 Good faith is hardly a procedural
obligation.393 Similarly, the right of access to enclaved property (and thus a
394
right of passage) is not procedural. Existing jurisprudence further has recog-
nized general principles in the context of tort law liability. 395 Commentary has
submitted that human rights obligations are reflected in general principles of
law. 396 This commentary has been confirmed in jurisprudence deeming that fair
access to justice constitutes a general principle of law,397 and further permitting
Law, EJIL: TALK! (July 15, 2016), http://www.ejiltalk.org/russia-and-china-challenge-the-westem-
hegemony-in-the-interpretation-of-intemational-law/.
388. See sources cited supra note 387.
389. Id.
390. G.A. Res. 217 (1I) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) ("No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to at-
tacks upon his honour and reputation.").
391. See Giorgio Gaja, General Principles of Law, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCL. PUB. INT'L L.
(May 2013) (listing procedural general principles including res judicata).
392. See CHENG, supra note 195, at 105-62 (defining the general principle of good faith).
393. Id.
394. See Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6, 136 (Apr. 12)
(dissent of Fernandes, J.).
395. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 1.C.J. 161, 324, 354-55 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion of
Simma, J.).
396. Simma & Alston, supra note 197, at 102-10; Gaja, supra note 391.
397. Dr. Horst Reineccius et al. v. Bank for International Settlements, 23 R.I.A.A. 252, 291 ¶
126 (Penn. Ct. Arb. 2003).
2017] 391
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
the inference that such access to justice correlates to the protection of substan-
tive rights from arbitrary and discriminatory government interference.398
Further, general principles do not look to an absolute overlap of legal sys-
tems. In practice, the principle of good faith has been incorporated into interna-
tional law despite the fact that it was not recognized in English common law. 399
The establishment of a general principle resembling requirements of substan-
tive due process might raise objections from at least some U.S. constitutional
lawyers. 400 These objections have not stood in the way of crystalizing general
principles of law in international jurisprudence.
More fundamentally, the objections fail in the context of privacy protec-
tions given the significant overlap in the recognition of a privacy right. This
discourse then is backed by a functional overlap that would at the very least ap-
ply the right to the kind of surveillance activity at issue in this Article. As dis-
cussed above, it is certainly true that different source systems disagree on the
ultimate derivation and full implementation of privacy. But this fact of different
theoretical justifications for the privacy right in the respective source systems is
a strength rather than a weakness. The Privacy Principle is not thinly supported
by requiring that legal systems take exactly the same steps to reach its norma-
tive conclusion. It robustly survives different outlooks, derivations, and ap-
proaches. The Privacy Principle is not a Rubik's Cube that must always be
401
solved just so. It is like the map of an ancient city that allows people to ar-
rive at the same destination using different, well-trodden, and equally meaning-
ful paths.
3. The Value of the Privacy Principle
The value of the Privacy Principle is to step into a normative gap and
provide firmer formal and functional rationales for extraterritorial privacy pro-
tection in international law. As a formal matter, the most the objection to the
human rights treaty or customary international law paradigm has been able to
establish is the absence of treaty obligations or customary rules establishing
privacy rights against global surveillance programs. 402 Objectors have not been
able to prove that there exists an affirmative right of the state to conduct such
activities under international law.403
To overcome this formal objection against the establishment of a privacy
right, it is thus only necessary to prove the existence of a source of law that
yields the desired prescription without running afoul of the technical defect af-
398. Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/07/1, Award, 1 187
(Mar. 31, 2010).
399. Zimmerman & Whittaker, supra note 225, at 3940.
400. See Joshua D. Hawley, The Intellectual Origins of (Modern) Substantive Due Process, 93
TEX. L. REV. 275 passim (2014) (outlining the heated debate surrounding the concept in U.S. jurispru-
dence).
401. See Niall Firth, Google Cracks Rubik's Cube by Proving Only 20 Moves Ever Needed to
Solve It, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 13, 2010), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1302414/Study-
uncovers-possible-Rubiks-Cube-solution-Only-20-moves-needed.html.




fecting its siblings.40 A general principle meets this requirement.40 5 It derives
an international law rule that cannot be outmaneuvered by reference to incon-
gruent state practice in foreign affairs. It does so by providing a different source
other than such outward state conduct as the voluntarist hook for the recogni-
tion of an international legal obligation: the state's own domestic law.
The value of a general principle, however, goes deeper than clever tech-
nicality. The insight of a host of legal publicists that privacy protections are
binding "notwithstanding state practice" points to the importance of the privacy
406
right for international law, as such4. Leading international jurists see privacy
rights-and the extension of privacy rights into the new world of cyberspace-
as an essential characteristic of what international law must be.407 In civil law
terms, these jurists reason by legal analogy that the extension of privacy protec-
tions to this new prescriptive frontier is a necessary feature of the logic of the
law as a whole.408 To deny privacy protections on purely voluntarist grounds
would be to misunderstand the normative force of the human rights edifice the
world has created since the end of, and to respond to the atrocities of, the Sec-
ond World War. 409
General principles of law were precisely introduced to permit such essen-
tialist, analogical reasoning to bear fruit. As Bin Cheng noted in his seminal
work on general principles, their inclusion within the list of recognized sources
410of international law had deeply naturalist underpinnings. These naturalist
underpinnings did not devolve law into moral philosophy, or worse, metaphys-
ics. 4 11 Rather, it permitted an outlet by which law could close gaps by analogi-
cal reasoning, as Hersch Lauterpacht has urged.4 12 General principles therefore
are the intended source of law to give force to normative principles so deeply
enwoven in the fabric of international law that to imagine international law
without them would be to unravel it. 4 13
In other words, hosts of the most highly esteemed publicists in interna-
tional law did not err in their assessment that international law must extend
meaningful privacy protections to cyberspace. 4 14 The use of general principles,
however, provides a better outlet for their insight. And in this case, reliance up-
on general principles provides more than a means to justify an essentialist de-
sideratum. As demonstrated in the prior sections, it provides concrete evidence
404. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 31, at 93 (discussing the purpose of general principles as
a source of international law).
405. See id.
406. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 28, at 193.
407. See id.
408. See James L. Dennis, Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and the Evalua-
tion of Judicial Precedent, 54 LA. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1993) (discussing the use of analogy in civil code
jurisdictions).
409. Molly Beutz Land, Protecting Rights Online, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (2009).
410. CHENG, supra note 195, at 3-4, 19.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 19; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 31, at 93.
413. See Simma & Alston, supra note 197, at 105 (discussing use of general principles in the
human rights context).
414. See supra Section I.A. 1 (outlining the literature of privacy right proponents).
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for the inductive establishment of a privacy right on the basis of contemporary
convergence upon this principle by widely diverse legal systems. It thus show-
cases that privacy is not simply a legal mirage reflecting the Western (or more
precisely Roman) undergirding of the law of peoples. It is a principle of legality
recognized across the legal traditions of many of the principal detractors of a
broader conception of the human right to privacy in cyberspace.
IV. DEFINING PRIVACY
The discussion so far has established that domestic private law recognizes
a general principle of law on privacy. Further, this Privacy Principle is compat-
ible with, and furthers principles inherent in, international law. A core func-
tional question that so far has remained unaddressed is whether there is in fact a
consistent definition of privacy in domestic private law to which the principle
could be applied - and whether this definition, in turn, is compatible with inter-
national law. This Part takes up each of these questions in turn.
A. Definition ofPrivacy in Private Law
Current comparative legal research confirms the existence of a common
definition of privacy in domestic private law.415 As a recent study succinctly
explained
Privacy guarantees the protection of quasi-spatial areas ('private/ intimate sphere'),
in which other private persons, the media, or the State are not permitted to intrude
upon without consent. The unauthorized intrusion can manifest itself in different
ways: through eavesdropping with a technical device, through photographing and
filming with a telephoto lens, video camera, or night vision devices; through read-
ing (and publishing) of private records (diaries, private correspondence, etc.) or
through online searching of private electronic information systems. A further sub-
category of privacy is the interest in anonymity, i.e., not to be dragged into public
light against his/ her will.416
Privacy, in other words, concerns first and foremost non-public spaces.417
418
Further, it concerns intimate or personal subject matters. When combined,
both of those factors give rise to a reasonable expectation of seclusion.4 19 It is
these expectations that the law protects.420
As discussed below, the core non-public spaces covered by the definition
of privacy are the home and traditional correspondence, as well as the tele-
phone, email, and certain kinds of online fora. As further discussed below, pri-
415. See Franz Wero, Comparative Studies in Private Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION
TO COMPARATIVE LAW 115, 120-21 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2012) (discussing the conver-
gence of privacy protections).
416. See GERT BROGGEMEIER, MODERNISING CIVIL LIABILITY LAW tN EUROPE, CHINA,
BRAZIL, AND RUSSIA: TEXTS AND COMMENTARIES 33 (2011).
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Shulman v. Grp. W. Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 490 (Cal. 1998), as modified on denial of
reh'g (July 29, 1998) ("The tort is proven only if the plaintiff had an objectively reasonable expectation
of seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation or data source.").
420. Id.; BROGGEMEIER, supra note 292, at 33 (noting the overlap in question); Wero, supra
note 415, at 120-21 (noting the constitutionalization of the privacy protection).
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vacy only protects non-public spaces to the extent that the conduct in those
spaces is personal in nature. The last section outlines the distinction between
personal conduct (protected as private) and public conduct conducted outside of
a public space (not protected in its own right as private even if conducted from
or in a non-public space).
1. The Home
All legal systems studied agree that conduct in the home is presumptively
private. Iran, a jurisdiction that does not recognize an express right to privacy
in its private law as such, extends express protection from intrusion to the
421home. All jurisdictions recognizing an express right to privacy similarly con-
sider that there is a significant reasonable expectation of seclusion in the
home.422
2. Traditional Correspondence and Telephone Calls
All legal systems studied treat correspondence and telephone calls as pre-
sumptively non-public spaces, giving rise to a reasonable expectation of seclu-
sion. The Iranian legal system includes such a protection both by way of Islam-
ic law and by constitutional principle.4 23 Similarly, the legal systems
recognizing an express right to privacy include correspondence within the
scope of spaces creating a reasonable expectation of seclusion.424
3. Email and Online Fora
In principle, the same protections covering traditional correspondence al-
so apply to virtual conduct. The United States, France, China, and Israel all
have recognized that virtual correspondence or online conduct is functionally
entitled to the same protections as traditional correspondence. 425 The same log-
ic applies in Russian and Iranian law, if by analogy. 426
421. See QURAN, 24:27-28. For a discussion of the legal implications of the passage in Iranian
jurisprudence, see Reza, supra note 312, at 792-95.
422. Daniel Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 477, 552 (2006) (as a matter
of U.S. law, "[fjor hundreds of years, the law has strongly guarded the privacy of the home"); see
LARR[BAU-TERNEYRE, supra note 363, at ¶ 762 (same as a matter of French law); SHAo, supra note
366, at 142 (same for China); Gidron, supra note 366, at 284 (same as a matter of Israeli law).
423. QURAN, 49:12. For a discussion of the legal implications of the passage, see Habibi, su-
pra note 310, at 3-4.
424. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (noting that correspondence gives rise
to expectation of seclusion as a matter of U.S. law); TAMARA KUZNETSOVA ET AL., RUSSIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 46 (2014) (discussing the Russian privacy rationale for correspondence); SHAO,
supra note 366, at 142 (same for China); Gidron, supra note 366, at 284 (same as a matter of Israeli
law); Hauch, supra note 298, at 1296 (same as a matter of French law).
425. Coal. for an Airline Passengers' Bill of Rights v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 2d
667, 675 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (extending intrusion to online conduct in the U.S.); SHAO, supra note 366, at
142 (same for China); Michael Bimhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, Does Law Matter Online? Empirical Ev-
idence on Privacy Law Compliance, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 317, 351-52 (2009) (same
for Israel); Yoshei Suda, Monitoring Emails of Employees in the Private Sector: A Comparison Between
Western Europe and the United States, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. REv. 209, 256-58 (2005) (discussing
the French Nikon case, which suggests an increase in the level of privacy protection for employees' e-
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But reasonable expectations of seclusion present greater complexities
427
online compared to traditional forms of communication.42 Some forms of
online communications, such as emails, are typically intended for specific re-
cipients.428 Here, the analogy to privacy in traditional correspondence is at its
strongest. But web-based forms of communications, such as posting on Face-
book, present a greater challenge. 429 Facebook permits a selection of who can
view a post-but is a generally public site.430 The reasonable expectation of se-
clusion will be significantly diminished in such fora precisely because they are
intended to communicate to broader, semi-public audiences.431 The specific na-
ture of the forum, the availability of password protection to exclude others, as
well as the scope of recipients will be important to determine the strength of
expectations of seclusion in information shared online.432
4. Personal or Intimate Nature ofProtected Conduct
Reasonable expectations of seclusion look not only to the place (real or
virtual) of an intrusion, but also the substance upon which a stranger in-
trudes.4 33 Expectations of seclusion extend only to personal or intimate con-
duct. 434 In other words, the expectation of seclusion in public conduct conduct-
ed from a non-public space is severely limited. 435 Concretely, a political
candidate who made an embarrassing gaffe in a pre-taped television interview
cannot enjoin the publication of the interview by the television station simply
because it was shot in the candidate's living room. The statement, embarrassing
though it may be, is not private or intimate.
mails); Christophe Vigneau, Information Technology and Worker's Privacy: The French Law, 23 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 351, 355-56 (2002) (same).
426. Ruslan Nurullaev, The Right to Be Forgotten in the European Union and in Russia (Nat'l
Res. U. Higher Sch. of Econ. Research Paper No. WP BRP 54/LAW/2015, 2015),
http://ssm.com/abstract=2669344 (discussing existing Russian regulation relating to online privacy);
Hassan & Bagheri, supra note 313 (same regarding Iran).
427. See Raymond Ku, Data Privacy as a Civil Right: The EU Gets It?, 103 KY. L.J. 391, 391
(2015) ("The growth in individuals using social media, as well as the growing ubiquity of data about
those individuals online in general, increasingly challenge the legitimacy of individual expectations of
privacy.").
428. See Ned Snow, A Copyright Conundrum: Protecting Email Privacy, 55 U. KAN. L. REV.
501, 522 (2015) (noting that even in the context of emails sent to shared email accounts such as edi-
tors@lawreview.edu, "the email sender still has an expectation of privacy in the email sent to each re-
cipient").
429. See Christina Gagnier, On Privacy: Liberty in the Digital Revolution, 11 J. HIGH TECH. L.
229, 269-70 (2011) ("This perception is facilitated by the fact that in its privacy options, users can select
to show individuals a 'Limited Profile,' selecting from a list of options of which information one wants
to reveal and which information they choose not to. This option in itself creates the illusion of a 'reason-
able expectation of privacy' when one chooses to use these options.").
430. Id.
43 1. Id.
432. See Allyson Haynes, Virtual Blinds: Finding Online Privacy in Offline Precedents, 14
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 603, 646-48 (2012) (proposing a four-factor balancing test to establish the
strength of online privacy expectations).





Problematically, there is no unifying definition of what constitutes per-
436sonal, intimate conduct or information. Instead, the private laws examined
for purposes of this Article have followed a (non-exclusive) list method to ex-
437plain what information is personal or intimate. All of the legal systems ex-
amined expressly recognize the following kind of conduct or information as
private: conduct or information relating to health; 438 marital status or relation-
ships;439 parental status or relationships;44 0 romantic relationships;" and sexu-
al conduct.442 Collectively, these legal systems have further recognized that
friendships, 443 political ideas,444 religious beliefs," 5  and financial infor-
mation46 are intimate and personal.
5. Public Conduct
The flipside of the intimacy requirement to reasonable expectations of se-
clusion is that public conduct gives rise to reasonable expectations of publicity.
Like privacy, public conduct is defined both in terms of space and content. The
jurisdiction with the strongest privacy protections, France, confirms that partic-
ipation at an event open to the public creates a presumption of publicity of
436. Joanna Kulesza, Walled Gardens of Privacy or "Binding Corporate Rules?": A Critical
Look at International Protection of Online Privacy, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 747, 755 (2012)
("Civil law offers no definition of 'intimacy."').
437. Id.
438. Lazette v. Kulmatycki, 949 F. Supp. 2d 748, 751, 761 (N.D. Ohio 2013) (noting that
health information is highly personal); KUZNETSOVA, supra note 424, at 46 (discussing Russian law);
SHAO, supra note 366, at 143-44 (discussing Chinese law); Gidron, supra note 366, at 288 (discussing
Israeli law); Hassan & Bagheri, supra note 313 (discussing Iranian law); Hauch, supra note 298, at
1246-49 (discussing French law); Shackelford, supra note 366, at 178 (discussing French law).
439. McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that marital status is
highly personal); RUDINSKI, supra note 360, at 49 (discussing same in Russian law); SHAD, supra note
366, at 142 (discussing same in Chinese law); Habibi, supra note 310, at 7 (discussing same in Iranian
law); Hauch, supra note 298, at 1246-49 (discussing French law); Shackelford, supra note 366, at 178
(discussing same in French law); Karin Yefet, Unchaining the Agunot: Enlisting the Israeli Constitution
in Service of Warren's Martial Freedom, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 441, 471 (2009) (discussing same in
Israeli law).
440. RUDINSKI, supra note 360, at 49 (discussing Russian law regarding privacy of family
life); SHAO, supra note 366, at 142 (discussing same in Chinese law); Christine Emery, Relational Pri-
vacy - A Right to Grieve in The Information Age, 42 RUTGERS L.J. 765, 773-75 (2011) (discussing same
in U.S. law); Habibi, supra note 310, at 7 (discussing Iranian law); Hauch, supra note 298, at 1246-49
(discussing same in French law); Shackelford, supra note 366, at 178 (discussing same in French law);
Yefet, supra note 441, at 471 (discussing same in Israeli law).
441. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, supra note 424, cmt. b (laying out U.S.
law); RUDINSKI, supra note 360, at 49 (discussing Russian law); SHAO, supra note 366, at 14344 (dis-
cussing Chinese law); Habibi, supra note 3 10, at 7 (discussing Iranian law); Hauch, supra note 298, at
1246-49 (discussing French law); Shackelford, supra note 366, at 178 (same).
442. Shackelford, supra note 366, at 178; Hassan & Bagheri, supra note 313 (discussing Ira-
nian law).
443. SHAO, supra note 366, at 143-44 (discussing Chinese law); Hauch, supra note 298, at
124649 (discussing French law); Shackelford, supra note 366, at 178 (same).
444. RUDINSKI, supra note 360, at 49 (discussing Russian law); Hauch, supra note 298, at
1246-49 (discussing French law); Shackelford, supra note 366, at 178 (same).
445. Shackelford, supra note 366, at 178; SHAO, supra note 366, at 142 (discussing Chinese
law); Gidron, supra note 366, at 293 (discussing Israeli law).
446. Elizabeth DeArmond, A Dearth ofRemedies, 113 P. ST. L. REv. 1, 41 (2008) ("The tort of
intrusion also applies to the disclosure of financial information" in United States law.); SHAO, supra
note 366, at 142 (discussing Chinese law).
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one's presence and conduct at the event." 7 Importantly, public events can take
place online to the extent that information is available to the world at large.4 8
This is not to say that reasonable expectations of seclusion entirely disap-
pear when in public, just that they are severely diminished.449 Thus, a man re-
lieving himself against a tree at a particularly lengthy political rally would
maintain a minimal expectation of seclusion by turning his back to the crowd
while urinating-but typically could not complain when issued a fine for disor-
derly conduct that the arresting officer indecently intruded upon the rally-goer's
privacy by observing him in flagrante delicto. He nevertheless might, depend-
ing upon the jurisdiction, complain if photographed by a paparazzo for personal
*450
gain.
Beyond public spaces, the conduct at issue itself can further be public.
For instance, the making of policy decisions is not itself a personal affair.451
The question whether conduct is public or private is fact-specific, as the recent
dispute about the foreign-directed hacking and disclosure of Secretary Clin-
ton's emails, as well as emails associated with her campaign, has demonstrat-
452
ed. To the extent that conduct or information is considered public, the Priva-
cy Principle would apply to such conduct only obliquely, i.e., to gather the
relevant information on policy decisions or the planning and preparation of
public events the intruder may also have gained access to personal information
as a byproduct of surveillance activity. 453 In those instances, the privacy expec-
tations in the personal information intruded upon extends some protection to
public conduct and thus provides some reasonable expectations of seclusion.
But these expectations, again, are significantly limited.
B. Integrating the Definition ofPrivacy in International Law
As discussed above, the Privacy Principle can rely upon a common un-
derstanding of privacy. This understanding of privacy can be synthesized into a
formula of reasonable expectations of seclusion based on the space intruded
upon and the substance of the information at issue. The Privacy Principle has
447. Hauch, supra note 298, at 1249 (discussing French law).
448. See sources cited supra notes 386-89.
449. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, supra note 424, cmt. b (laying out U.S. law);
SHAO, supra note 366, at 142-44 (discussing Chinese law); Gidron, supra note 366, at 285 (discussing
Israeli law); Hassan & Bagheri, supra note 313 (discussing Iranian law); Hauch, supra note 298, at 1249
(discussing French law).
450. See Int'l Herald Tribune, Strict Press Laws Govern Any Invasion of Privacy: France No
Paparazzi Market, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/01/news/01iht-
laws.t.html (discussing French privacy law in the wake of Princess Diana's death).
451. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, supra note 424, cmt. d (intrusion must
be highly objectionable as a matter of U.S. law); Hauch, supra note 298, at 1249 (discussing French
law).
452. See Josh Gerstein & Rachel Bade, State Dept. Releases Final Haul of Clinton Emails,
POLITICO (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/hillary-clinton-emails-top-secret-
219988 ("Critics have noted that Clinton's lawyers selected the emails turned over to State and that she
instructed her staff to delete about 32,000 messages deemed personal by her team.").
453. See John F. Decker, Overbreadth Outside the First Amendment, 34 N.M. L. REV. 53, 84-
85 (2004) (discussing overbreadth in the privacy context as related to contraceptives).
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developed a core agreement between legal systems on the protection of the
home and correspondence, as well as intuitively intimate data.
This definition of privacy can be readily integrated into international law.
It tracks the same kind of spaces already covered by human rights law.454 It fur
ther covers the same kind of information protected by human rights law.455
The Privacy Principle, in other words, is consistent with existing international
legal obligations.
To the extent that there is a conflict between international law and the
Privacy Principle, this conflict concerns state-to-state surveillance.456 Thus,
customary international law would suggest an acquiescence by states in surveil-
lance of governmental conduct. 457 This acquiescence has expressly been made
part of key diplomatic treaties.458 If governmental data typically subject to hu-
man and signals intelligence were protected by the Privacy Principle, the Priva-
cy Principle would arguably protect too much to be consistent with state-to-
state practice.459
The Privacy Principle is responsive to such concerns. The reasonable ex-
pectation of seclusion in governmental data is comparatively low. The subject
matter at issue in official governmental communications is neither personal nor
intimate. It does not cover the kind of information typically protected by the
Privacy Principle. Quite to the contrary, the information at issue is by definition
public. And it is gathered by targeting governmental information infrastructures
as opposed to personal computer programs. Given acquiescence in prior state
practices of espionage, the expectation of seclusion will be further limited. 460
The expectation of seclusion does not, however, completely disappear; as dis-
cussed below, it can give rise to a determination of wrongfulness when the in-
terest of publicity of the surveilling state is even less pronounced (as would be
the case were the espionage in question motivated purely by the desire to settle
a personal score, as appears to be the case in the context of current Russian sur-
veillance and publication of emails of Democratic National Committee execu-
tives). 46 1
An additional concern is that the Privacy Principle is overly restrictive of
state action to protect the public against terrorist threats. This concern will be
addressed in more detail in the next Part. Notably, however, the surveillance of
open web-based platforms and the tracking of persons visiting websites associ-
ated with terrorist activities are not prohibited by the Privacy Principle. Signals
intelligence in this context would simply monitor global public (cyber-)spaces.
The Privacy Principle precisely permits such conduct. Armed with this intelli-
454. Milanovic, supra note 23, at 122.
455. Id.
456. Chesterman, supra note 155, at 1077.
457. Id.
458. See supra Section I.B (discussing ICJ jurisprudence).
459. Chesterman, supra note 155, at 1077.
460. Id.
461. Simon Shuster, Vladimir Putin's Bad Blood with Hillary Clinton, TIME (July 25, 2016),
http://time.com/4422723/putin-russia-hillary-clinton (discussing the likely personal motivations for e-
mail surveillance and publication of DNC materials at Vladimir Putin's alleged orders).
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gence, it is then possible to tailor appropriate signals intelligence programs by
identifying targets for further intelligence.
The Privacy Principle therefore can provide strong guidance for global
signals intelligence programs. The Privacy Principle not only provides a coher-
ent understanding of what kind of conduct is internationally wrongful, but it
also provides a coherent and workable definition of privacy consistent with in-
ternational law.
V. PROPORTIONALITY
The Privacy Principle does not deal in absolutes. To the contrary, the Pri-
vacy Principle defines privacy by reference to reasonable expectations of seclu-
sion. The reasonableness-and thus the strength-of these expectations can
fluctuate depending upon the circumstances. This in and of itself means that
462privacy rights do not have an on-off switch. The Privacy Principle does not
have a minimum threshold over which its protection is absolute and below
which it permits unbridled intrusion. 463
As discussed in this final Part, private law confirms that privacy rights are
limited by concerns of proportionality. Determining the scope and strength of
privacy rights requires balancing. This balancing test at the core of the Privacy
Principle is consistent with general international law. Consequently, the fully
constituted Privacy Principle must be incorporated into general international
law.
A. Proportionality as a Limit on Privacy in Private Law
Intuitively, protecting privacy must be a balancing act. As one compara-
tive legal study on privacy law in Europe put it, privacy analysis "is a sensitive,
contextual balancing exercise, resolved through examination of the value of the
[competing] claims." 464 The legal systems studied for this Article confirm as
much: privacy protections require a proportional balancing of the reasonable
expectation of seclusion of the person negatively affected by an intrusion or
publication in light of the reasonable interest of the intruding party and the in-
terests of the public at large. Should this analysis conclude that, on balance, the
intrusion is proportionate to the strength of the competing claims, the conduct
is not a civil wrong despite the effect on a person's sphere of intimacy.465
As this section sets out, the balancing test has two analytically distinct
components. First, the balancing test measures the relative strength of the inter-
ests at stake. Second, the balancing test is means sensitive - how is the intru-
462. See Paul M. Schwartz, From Victorian Secrecy to Cyberspace Shaming, 76 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1407, 1433 (2009) (discussing literature supporting that privacy is not an on-off switch).
463. See Anita L. Allen, Unpopular Privacy: The Case for Government Mandates, 32 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REv. 87, 92 (2007) ("It is generally agreed that privacy rights, are not absolute even if fun-
damental rights and human rights are.").
464. Gavin Phillipson, The "Right" to Privacy in England and Strasbourg Compared, in NEW
DIMENSION IN PRIVACY LAW 184, 219 (Andrew Kenyon & Megan Richardson eds., 2006).
465. Suda, supra note 425, at 256-58 (discussing the French Nikon case); Vigneau, supra note
425, at 355-56 (same).
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sion carried out and are other less restrictive means reasonably available to sat-
isfy the interests countervailing privacy? Each of these two components is dis-
cussed below in turn.
1. Balancing Interests
The private laws examined for this Article balance conflicting interests to
determine whether there has been a wrongful intrusion of privacy. The balance
begins with the assessment of the factual strength of the reasonable expecta-
tions of seclusion at issue in a given case. As discussed above, this analysis is
already part and parcel of determining whether a privacy interest is at stake at
all.
It next takes into account the strength of the reasonable expectation of
publicity of the intruding party.466 Why does the intruder wish to gather or pub-
lish information? For instance, an employer may wish to monitor employee
work email accounts to protect confidentiality of intellectual property or ensure
467appropriate customer care. Similarly, privacy and freedom of expression can
in some instances come into conflict.46 8 This part of the balancing test estab-
lishes the contextual strength of these interests; it measures the reasonable ex-
pectations of publicity.
The balancing test finally takes into account the interest of the public at
469large. Again in the context of publication of information, one typical interest
is the freedom of the press.470 The public has an interest in vigorous discussion
of matters of public concerns.47 1 This interest requires the disclosure of certain
kinds of information that the target of inquiry would rather have kept from pub-
. . 472 * *lic view. Similarly, public safety may well be an interest, as might be the
466. Gidron, supra note 366, at 289 (discussing the balance between privacy and freedom of
expression in Israeli law); Marc A. Sherman, Webmail at Work: The Case Against Employer Monitor-
ing, 23 TOURO L. REV. 647, 652-53 (2007) (applying such a balancing test in the context of worker email
privacy in the U.S.); Suda, supra note 425, at 256-58 (discussing the French Nikon case).
467. Sherman, supra note 466, at 657-59 (discussing why employers monitor employees'
email).
468. Gidron, supra note 366, at 289 (discussing the balance between privacy and freedom of
expression in Israeli law).
469. See CHARLES J. GLASSER, INTERNATIONAL LIBEL AND PRIVACY HANDBOOK 434-35
(2013) (discussing public interest as a matter of Russian law); SHAO, supra note 366, at 142 (public in-
terest analysis as a matter of Chinese law); Gidron, supra note 366, at 289 (discussing public interest as
a matter of Israeli law); Natasha Lehrer, D'Artagnan's Tune, in TUNE PRIVACY is DEAD 56, 57-58 (Jo
Gainsville ed., 2011) (discussing public interest as a matter of French law); Paul Schwartz & Karl-
Nikolas Peifer, Prosser's Privacy and the German Right of Personality, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1925, 1956-60
(2010) (public interest analysis as a matter of U.S. law). But see Hassan & Bagheri, supra note 313
("Iranian law neither clarifies the exceptional issues such as public interests or security instances in
which the consent of data subjects may not be necessary nor differentiate[s] between sensitive and nor-
mal data .... ).
470. See GLASSER, supra note 469, at 434-35 (discussing freedom of the press); Gidron, supra
note 366, at 289 (same); Lehrer, supra note 469, at 57-58 (same).
471. See Marc J. Blitz, The Right to Map (and Avoid Being Mapped): Reconceiving First
Amendment Protection for Information-Gathering in the Age of Geotagging and Google Earth, 14
COLUM. SCI & TECH. L. REv. 115, 171-72 (2013) (discussing public interest as a core element of free-
dom of the press in United States law).
472. See, e.g., Privacy: the French President, the Actress and the Public Interest, INFORRM'S
BLOG (Jan. 13, 2014), https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/01/13/privacy-the-french-president-the-
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case in the context of the disclosure of health or safety risks.473 This part of the
balancing test establishes the contextual strength of these interests - it measures
the reasonable expectations of the public. 474
The proportionality analysis tests the relative strength of each of these in-
terests in their factual context.475 It looks to establish the relationship of the
case at bar to other more paradigmatic instances in the past in which the law
protected the interest at issue.476 Does the intrusion into privacy more resemble
the Panama Papers or an explicit Paris Hilton video? 477 Such contextual analy-
sis avoids the problem of balancing the underlying interests in the abstract
(should we value privacy more than freedom of expression?).
To say that an intrusion is proportionate in this sense thus simply means
that publicity interests contextually outweigh privacy interests. The factual link
of the case at bar to paradigmatic instances of public interest are significant.
However, the factual link of the case to paradigmatic instances of personal or
intimate conduct are more attenuated. Contextually, the intrusion is propor-
tionate to the privacy interests, the reasonable expectation of seclusion, at stake.
2. Means Used to Intrude
478
Proportionality also measures the propriety of means. Proportionality
refers to the comparison of the case at bar to past instances in which publicity
interests outweighed privacy interests. This does not take into account whether
the intruder reasonably could have used a different means to achieve its
goals. 479
Once it has been established that there is a genuine interest to intrude in a
given case, the means used to protect this interest become significant. It may480
well be true that there is a genuine interest in publishing the Panama Papers.
actress-and-the-public-interest/ (discussing the disclosure of an affair between President Hollande and
an actress by the French press).
473. See GLASSER, supra note 469, at 434-35 (public interest analysis); SHAO, supra note 366,
at 142 (same).
474. See sources cited supra notes 470-71.
475. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779,
831-34 (1994) (discussing privacy in incommensurate balancing exercises).
476. See id.
477. Compare Bruce Zagaris, ICIJ Panama Papers Cause Waive in Transparency and Ac-
countability, 32(4) INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 123 (2016) (discussing the Panama Papers), with Jo-
seph Siprut, The Naked Newscaster, Girls Gone Wild, and Paris Hilton: The True Tale of the Right to
Privacy and the First Amendment, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA L. & ENT. L.J. 35 (2005) (dis-
cussing explicit celebrity tapes and the right to privacy).
478. See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J.
3094, 3099 (2015) (discussing this aspect of proportionality in comparative public law).
479. See id. (discussing different means-end based inquiries in public law).
480. See Claire Lauterbach, Panama Papers law firm founder says massive offshore company
leak is 'campaign against privacy'. We disagree, PRIVACY INT'L (Apr. 4, 2016),
https://www.privacyintemational.org/node/824 (arguing that the Panama Papers leak does not implicate
privacy but implicates transparency); Lili Levi, Journalism Standards and "The Dark Arts:" The U.K. 's
Leveson Inquiry and the U.S. Media in the Age of Surveillance, 48 GA. L. REV. 907, 909 (2014) (noting
the $400 million in settlements paid by News of the World for phone hacking of celebrities).
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That does not give journalists license to hack every law firm with impunity in
search of more troves like the Panama Papers. 481
Proportionality of means again refers to two distinct analyses. First, it re-
fers to how narrowly the means were tailored to achieve a given end.482 This
requires an examination of reasonably available alternative courses of con-
duct.483 If a less intrusive means would have been available to achieve the same
goal, the interest served must be significantly more important to make the in-
trusion proportionate. 484
Second, even if no less intrusive means would have been available to
achieve the goal in question, one must consider the collateral damage done by
485the means chosen. Assume it were possible to prove that a fictional leader of
a certain Eastern European Great Power had siphoned billions of dollars in pub-
lic money to personal accounts, but this proof would require hacking every
bank in the United Kingdom and sifting through terabytes of financial records
of ordinary people.48 6 The collateral damage here would almost certainly out-
weigh legitimate global transparency interests despite the fact that no less re-
487strictive means is available to discover information of great public concern.
The proportionality analysis has important implications. If the interests at
issue in favor of publicity outweighed reasonable expectations of seclusion and
the means of intrusion were reasonable, there is no violation of the Privacy
488 489Principle.488 Public interest can trump privacy concerns. In those instances,
the Privacy Principle does more than tolerate intrusions upon reasonable expec-
tations of seclusion. 490 The Privacy Principle accepts that intrusion is legiti-
mate.491 Intrusion is in fact desirable.
Due to the proportionality analysis, the Privacy Principle therefore be-
comes more than a shield against intrusive conduct. It acts as more than a lia-
492bility rule deeming certain kinds of conduct wrongful4. It helps to establish
protocols for determining when one should intrude. 493 It provides a contextual-
ly tested principled reason for gathering intelligence and for using it. 494 The
481. See Zagaris, supra note 477, at 123-25 (discussing the value of the Panama Papers).
482. See Gidron, supra note 366, at 289 (discussing Israeli law); Andrew Serwin, Privacy
3.0-The Principle ofProportionality, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 869, 875-76 (2009) (deriving a princi-
ple of proportionality for U.S. law); Suda, supra note 425, at 256-58 (discussing the French Nikon case);
Vigneau, supra note 425, at 355-56 (same).
483. Levi, supra note 480, 909.
484. See Jackson, supra note 478, at 3113 (discussing this form of proportionality).
485. See id.
486. See id. at 3117 (discussing proportionality as such in Canadian public law in similar
terms).
487. See id.




492. See REISMAN, supra note 165, at 21 (distinguishing a textual-rule based mode of deci-
sionmaking from a context-policy based mode of decisionmaking); Guido Calabresi, Torts-The Law of
the Mixed Society, 56 TEX. L. REV. 519, 521 (1978) (discussing the difference between liability rules
and regulatory conduct).
493. See sources cited supra note 482.
494. See id.
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Privacy Principle thus improves and refines ad hoc rationalizations for intrusive
conduct. 495 It explains why some circumstances make intrusion a social
good.496
The Privacy Principle, in other words, can guide intelligence-gathering
efforts. It can assist in identifying and choosing targets for intelligence gather-
ing. It can assist in means testing the intelligence tools used. It thus provides a
legal rubric that can be used ex ante to supplement other policy tools.
B. Integrating the Proportionality Exception into International Law
The proportionality test developed on the basis of private law sources is
fully consistent with existing human rights law as developed above. Like pri-
vate law, human rights law relies upon proportionality analyses to assess poten-
tial liability for intrusions of privacy.497 The proportionality analysis used in
human rights law further functionally mirrors the understanding of proportion-
ality in private law.498 In fact, both private law and human rights law have al-
ready greatly enriched each other in actual adjudications of invasion of privacy
.499
claims.
Integrating the Privacy Principle with its proportionality analysis in inter-
national law can greatly help appraise existing intelligence gathering efforts.
Public interest in safety is certainly significant.500 But the interest will have to
be contextually tested both in terms of the threat presented and in terms of the
privacy interest intruded upon.501 Reviewing work emails and tapping work
phones implies different privacy interests than snooping on a bedroom by re-
motely enabling a web camera. 502 Further, the concern for public safety is
greater when intelligence gathering responds to specific threats as opposed to
instituting a global program in case a new threat might emerge.503
Integrating proportional means testing highlights the need for specific
targeting. In terms of least restrictive means testing, it will have to be queried
whether collaborative efforts with local law enforcement officials might have
been feasible.50 If it is possible to cooperate with foreign law enforcement
agencies to gather intelligence, such efforts would assure the additional due
process protections for the targets. 505  The targets would have effective re-
course should their privacy be wrongfully invaded; they would be immediately
able to file a claim against their home government pursuant to available public





499. Phillipson, supra note 464, at 219 (discussing the influence of European Court of Human
Rights law on English law).
500. See Milanovic, supra note 23, at 139 (discussing security interests).
501. See sources cited supra notes 466, 478-80.
502. See sources cited supra notes 466, 478-80.
503. Id.
504. Id.
505. ICCPR, supra note 36, art. 19.
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Even if working with local law enforcement is not feasible, intelligence-
gathering conduct cannot cover every communication spanning the globe. It is
at its most legitimate when it can rely upon specific information linking a per-
son or a group of persons to a specific threat.506 The narrower the field of sur-
veillance targets and the more contextually sensitive the criteria for selecting
targets, the stronger the claim to proportionality by the state's intelligence ser-
*507
vices.
The Privacy Principle can now be put to further use in order to backstop
or help design existing efforts. Thus, websites used by hostile organizations to
recruit new members are presumptively public.508 The threat posed by the hos-
tile organization for life, safety, and prosperity of the intelligence gathering
state will permit a quantification of intelligence gathering interest.509 If that in-
terest is great, proportionality analysis would deem it desirable to monitor the
websites in question and to log visitors.5 10
The information gathered in public virtual spaces can then be used to de-
velop specific target lists directly linked to significant threats. To the extent it
is possible as a matter of foreign policy and policing efficacy to make the home
state of the individual in question aware of the individual's threat posture, dis-
closure of the information in question would itself be desirable because it is in
the public interest-i.e., the interest of the gathering state, home state of the
target, and the world community at large. 511 Disclosure further would be in the
interest of the target of the intelligence operation as it would immediately ex-
tend the due process protections applicable as a matter of the law of his or her
home state and international law to all further investigations. 5 12
To the extent that disclosure is not feasible, the target list would support
the surveillance of repeat visitors.513 The surveillance could be tiered to moni-
tor websites used by multiple targets. If this next step yields intelligence con-
firming a threat, a full surveillance of the person's electronic correspondence
and even home may well be warranted. This in turn would yield new targets for
further intelligence gathering and so on.
The Privacy Principle thus permits the construction of intelligence gather-
ing programs that facially protect both privacy and security interests. To the ex-
tent that threat levels measurably increase, proportionality analysis would ex-
pand permissible intelligence gathering efforts. It would also point to
meaningful next steps to develop actionable intelligence rather than amassing
an unmanageable sea of big data. The Privacy Principle, in other words, can
506. See supra Sections V.A.1-2 (discussing the scope of intelligence gathering).
507. Id.
508. See Ku, supra note 427, at 391.




513. See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REv. 311,
328 (2012) (noting in the context of longer term surveillance that "[t]he repeated use of nonsearch tech-
niques has been considered an essential way to create probable cause that justifies searches rather than
an unlawful search itself').
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become a policy tool for the development of intelligence, rather than simply an
impediment to intelligence gathering.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Privacy Principle is an international legal prescription that can be ap-
plied to signals intelligence efforts. It thus transforms signals intelligence from
a space currently suffering from fragmented international legal rules at best, or
a complete vacuum of legal rules at worst, into a sphere governable by general
international law. The Privacy Principle does so by vindicating privacy rights in
reasonable expectations of seclusion of private citizens as anchored in the pri-
vate laws of leading global legal systems.
The Privacy Principle is decidedly non-occidental. It forms part of diverse
legal systems inspired by Western rationalism, pragmatic policy-science, Con-
fucianism, Islam, and Jewish tradition. This principle is accepted by key mem-
bers of the intelligence community to govern their own private internal affairs.
It is thus opposable to these members without risk of prescribing international
rules of conduct not supported by authoritative expectations in their respective
civil societies. In other words, the Privacy Principle is legitimate both as a mat-
ter of international and domestic law.
But the Privacy Principle is more than a liability rule designating certain
intelligence programs as internationally wrongful. It provides guidance to intel-
ligence officers. It can provide a means to determine intelligence priorities. It
can assist in designing intelligence programs that manageably meet these pri-
orities. It is a policy tool as well as a legal limit on state conduct.
Given the current state of global violence, the Privacy Principle is greatly
needed. The near weekly reports of violent, mass casualty attacks on civilians
in the West, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia present a significant temptation
to spy indiscriminately on the entire world population.514 The Privacy Principle
emphatically rejects any such efforts as both illegal and unwise. Such efforts
would not respect the very authoritative expectations shared by states and their
citizens as to what spaces, conduct, and thoughts remained private. 51 Thwart-
ing such expectations can be quickly perceived as repressive.516 Repressive
government conduct engenders further disaffection in the civil population in
both target states and intelligence gathering states: both in equal measure per-
ceive that law is ineffective in protecting their respective interests. 5 " This in
turn leads to an increased likelihood of future strife and violence.5 18
514. Cameron Glenn, Timeline: Rise and Spread of the Islamic State, WILSON CTR. (July 5,
2016), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-rise-and-spread-the-islamic-state (chronicling ISIL
attacks).
515. See Frederic Sourgens, The End of Law: The ISIL Case Study for a Comprehensive Theo-
ry of Lawlessness, 39 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 355, 369-72 (2015) (discussing the importance of authorita-
tive expectations for lawfulness).





This is not to say that the Privacy Principle condemns us to suffer vio-
lence without means of thwarting potential plots. It provides for clearly identi-
fiable and justifiable pathways to conduct global and cooperative intelligence
gathering. These pathways help narrow the field of inquiry to a manageable and
digestible set of data. They extend the set of actors contributing to these efforts
from one state's agency to that of a broader global community committed to
stopping the mass killing of civilians. The Privacy Principle thus provides a
means to carry the intelligence function of the world community discriminately
and prudently. The Privacy Principle is one instance in which legal decision
making processes devise sensible policy in the face of severe uncertainty and
distrust. 519 In following the Privacy Principle, intelligence gathering will re-
duce uncertainty and engender trust in equal measure. This twin reduction of
uncertainty and building of trust is the central function of legal processes in the
world community.520
519. See REISMAN, supra note 165, at 21 (submitting that the task of legal scholars is to design
lawful decisions that are contextually meaningful and realistic).
520. See id.
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